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Debunking the Basis Myth Under the Income Taxt
JOSEPH M. DODGE* AND JAY A. SOLED"
Tax basis is one of the most important, yet least studied, aspects of the income tax.
This analysis calls attention to its importance and argues that taxpayers have the
motivation, opportunity, and means to inflate the tax basis they have in their assets
and, in some cases, to avoid the reporting of gains. We discuss the likely causes of
these phenomena, estimate the probable revenue loss, and propose appropriate reforms.
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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental linchpin of the income tax system is the computation of gain and loss
under Internal Revenue Code section 1001. This Code section provides that the net
amount realized less adjusted basis determines a taxpayer's gain or loss.. The amount
realized is a current "fact" and presents no major conceptual or administrative
problem.
2
A prevailing myth is that basis rules are also as easily and happily understood and
complied with so as to be virtually self-executing. After all, a taxpayer's basis appears
to be simply the item's acquisition cost less any cost recovery incurred in the form of
depreciation or amortization. Thus, $10,000 is the initial cost basis of a farm tractor
t Copyright 2006 Joseph M. Dodge and Jay A. Soled. All rights reserved.
* Joseph M. Dodge is the Steams, Weaver, Miller, Weissler, Alhadeff & Sitterson
Professor at Florida State University College of Law.
** Jay A. Soled is a professor at Rutgers University.
1. I.R.C. § 1001(a). Gains are includible in gross income under I.R.C. § 61(a)(3), and
losses are deductible under I.R.C. § 165(a) in arriving at taxable income, unless (in the case of
individuals) the loss involves a personal-use asset (and the loss does not result from casualty or
theft). I.R.C. § 165(c). In the case of individuals, capital losses (losses from the "sale or
exchange" of a "capital asset") are allowable as deductions in the current year only to the extent
of the amount of capital gains for the year plus $3,000. See I.R.C. § 1211 (b).
2. For a detailed discussion of I.R.C. § 1001, see Louis A. Del Cotto, Sales and Other
Dispositions of Property Under Section 1001: The Taxable Event, Amount Realized and Related
Problems of Basis, 26 BuFF. L. REv. 219 (1977).
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purchased for that amount; assuming that the taxpayer uses the tractor in its trade or
business and depreciates it by $4,000, the tractor's adjusted basis is $6,000.
This myth has sacred status among tax academics because of the importance we
attach to basis. Indeed, basis, capitalization, and capital recovery are how we
differentiate an income tax from other tax models (e.g., a consumption tax), and tax
academics rightly think that understanding basis and related issues is a key factor for
student comprehension of the income tax.3 But we should not blithely assume that
other players in the tax arena, especially taxpayers and tax return preparers who follow
tax return instructions and manuals rather than theory, take the issue of tax basis so
seriously and reverently.
In reality, tax basis is commonly overstated (especially in the case of individual
taxpayers), whether inadvertently or intentionally, in connection with the reporting of
gains and losses on investments. For every dollar of overstated basis in the assets
taxpayers sell, there is either one less dollar of gain or one more dollar of loss to report.
Aside from the obvious tax-savings motivation, taxpayers have the opportunity and
means to overstate basis without running a meaningful risk of sanction. In addition,
there are certain opportunities for not reporting transactions that produce gains. Such
basis and gain noncompliance causes severe revenue losses amounting to billions of
dollars and undermines the integrity of our tax system. In order to protect the
government's coffers and to restore integrity to the tax system, we propose various
moderate and relatively simple changes in the law to address these problems. Adoption
of these changes should have considerable political appeal given that these changes
have the potential to raise significant revenue without "raising taxes.
' 4
3. The only monograph on tax basis has 120 pages of text, of which only three pages are
devoted to the general issue of basis reporting and record keeping, with no citations to cases
involving basis compliance issues. James Maule, Income Tax Basis: Overview and Conceptual
Aspects, 560 TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS (BNA) Al 18-20 (2000). A perusal of several law school
casebooks on individual income tax reveals (at most) minimal mention of basis compliance
issues. Currently, for example, the leading law school textbook for introductory income tax
contains only six cases, most over a half-century old, that discuss the issue of tax basis--and do
so from the purely conceptual angle. JAMES J. FREELAND, DANIEL J. LATHROPE, STEPHEN A. LIND
& RICHARD B. STEPHENS, FuNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 118-28 (13th ed.
2004).
4. It might be said the problem of ascertaining basis disappears under a cash-flow
consumption tax, where the cost of investments is fully deductible. See generally William D.
Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113,
1136, 1141, 1162-64, 1183-84 (1974) (analyzing the effects of a cash-flow consumption tax on
determining basis, particularly for transfers at death and by gift). Similarly, under a wage tax,
where only income derived from employment is taxable, basis is also irrelevant because
investment returns of all kinds are excludible from the tax base. See generally Deborah A. Geier,
Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA.
TAX REv. 1 (2002) (examining the consequences of a "wage tax" in which federal income and
payroll taxes were integrated). Alternatively, basis issues would be minimized under the Schanz-
Haig-Simons "accretion" income tax model (i.e., where all annual net increases to wealth would
be recognized even if not "realized"). See generally ROBERT M. HAIG, THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX (1921); HENRY C. SIMONs, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATiON (1938); GEORG SCHANz, Der
Einkommensbegriff und die Einkommensteuergesetze, 13 FiNANzAcHI v 1 (1896).
Notwithstanding the views these commentators advance, this essay assumes that there is enough
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As evidence of the pervasiveness of the tax basis myth, no commentator, to our
knowledge, has raised as a major issue whether taxpayers actually understand or
comply with basis and gain-recognition rules and, for that matter, whether the IRS has
the ability to monitor and enforce such rules.5 Indeed, only once in this country's
history was a basis or gain compliance problem seriously spotlighted. This was when
in 1976 the carryover basis rule for assets acquired by reason of death was instituted.6
In theory, this carryover rule seemed simple enough: estate beneficiaries would step
into the decedent's "shoes" insofar as their tax basis in inherited assets was concerned.7
Yet in response to the institution of this carryover basis rule, there was a tremendous
public uproar. Why? There were several reasons: taxpayers found it "impossible" to
ascertain a decedent's tax basis in an asset,8 the complexity of implementing the rule
political inertia and support to continue the existing "realization" income tax, which itself can be
viewed as a political compromise between an accretion income tax and a cash-flow consumption
tax. See Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1, 43-86
(2000); Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAx L. REv. 355,
374-77 (2004). Indeed, the George W. Bush administration, no fan of the current income tax
system, seems resolved to maintain its fundamental tenets. See PRESIDENT'S ADvISORY PANEL ON
TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM
(2005), available at http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/.
5. To the contrary, many commentators view the income tax system, despite having its
blemishes, as readily administrable by taxpayers and the IRS alike. Compare Daniel Halperin,
Saving the Income Tax: An Agenda for Research, 77 TAX NOTES 967 (1997) (highlighting the
complexities that arise under realization-based tax system), with Jerome Kurtz, Two Cheers for
the Income Tax, 27 OHIoN.U. L. REv. 161 (2001) (arguing, as former IRS commissioner, for the
current income tax over alternatives while urging improved enforcement and simplification of
the current tax system), and Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral
Accretionism, and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (1997) (arguing for
a realization-based tax system over an accretion-based alternative). Other authors have written
on the topic of tax basis, but the thrust of their articles deals almost exclusively with
computational issues. See generally Maurice C. Greenbaum, The Basis ofProperty Shall Be the
Cost of Such Property: How Is Cost Defined?, 3 TAX L. REv. 351 (1948) (analyzing
computation of cost in various situations); Erik M. Jensen, The Unanswered Question in Tufts:
What Was the Purchaser's Basis?, 10 VA. TAX REv. 455 (1991) (arguing for considering the
acquisition circumstances when determining the basis of an acquisition that is subject to a
mortgage exceeding the property's value); Harold Wurzel, The Tax Basisfor AssortedBargain
Purchases or: The Inordinate Cost of "Ersatz" Legislation, 20 TAX L. REv. 165 (1964)
(analyzing problems associated with the Internal Revenue Code's silence on determining basis
for bargain purchases).
6. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1520, 1872-77 (1976)
(repealed 1980) [hereinafter Former I.R.C. § 1023]. For a detailed discussion of this provision,
see THOMAS J. McGRATH & JONATHAN G. BLATFMACHR, CARRYOVER BASIS UNDER THE 1976
TAX ACT (1977).
7. To illustrate how this rule was to operate, consider the plight of B, who purchases ten
shares of Company X for $100. Assume B dies when Company X shares are worth $1,000.
Under Former I.R.C. § 1023, the recipient of Company X shares would "carry over" the $100
tax basis that B had in such shares.
8. The purported failure of others to be able to identify the basis that decedents held in
their investments made the implementation of the carryover rule suspect. See, e.g., Carryover
Basis Provisions: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
13 (1979) (statement of American Bankers Association) (Manufacturer's Hanover Trust
Company reported that cost basis information for marketable securities was impossible to locate
20061
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proved enormous, 9 and the IRS was given few weapons to safeguard its enforcement.10
These flaws led Congress to retroactively repeal the carryover basis rule in 1980.11
The very same attacks that led to the repeal of the 1976 carryover basis rule can
readily be lodged against the status quo. That is, under the current income tax regime,
(a) taxpayers often lack the acumen and requisite records and information to fulfill
their tax basis reporting obligations, (b) the rules themselves are unwieldy and
complicated, and (c) the IRS is unable to fulfill its compliance mission insofar as basis
and gain monitoring is concerned.12
in 22% of estates, required time and research in 44%, and was readily available in 34%); id. at
126-29 (statement of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)) (offering
letters from practitioners indicating the difficulty in reconstructing basis of old stock certificates,
closely held stock, and stock that underwent recapitalizations or stock splits). For a detailed look
at the tax bar's critique of the carryover basis rule, see Howard J. Hoffman, The Role of the Bar
in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 TAX L. REV. 411,448-66 (1982). Some of the problems in
ascertaining historical basis are discussed in McGRATH & BLArrMACHR, supra note 6, at 191-
94,222-28.
Aside from taxpayers' investments, another concern regarding the efficacy of the carryover
basis rules had to do with determining basis for personal-use tangible property. Since losses on
such property are usually disallowed, see I.R.C. § 165(c), taxpayers rarely keep accurate basis
records in such assets. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV.
361,425 (1993) ("[Personal-use tangible personal assets] are the assets for which adequate basis
records most likely do not exist. Taxpayers may fail to keep basis records for [such property]
because the costs are often trivial, because they do not expect the assets to appreciate, because
they know a loss would be nondeductible, and simply because the non-business context of the
acquisition makes business type records seem unnecessary."); Philip R. Stansbury & Doris D.
Blazek, Revamped Basis Rules for Inherited Properly Have Far-Reaching Implications, 46 J.
TAX'N 14, 14 (1977) ("... establishing the decedent's basis in [personal-use tangible personal
property] is difficult.").
9. For a detailed exposition of these transition rules, see Richard B. Covey & Dan T.
Hastings, Cleaning up Carryover Basis, 31 TAX LAW. 615, 621-22, 641-57 (1978); Zelenak,
supra note 8, at 382-88.
10. See, e.g., Former I.R.C. § 1023(g)(3) (taxpayers were given the opportunity to make
reasonable estimates as to their basis in assets).
11. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 229,
299 (1980). In order to repeal the estate tax and as part of a political compromise, Congress
recently passed a modified carryover basis rule, I.R.C. § 1022, effective for decedents dying
after 2009. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
542, 115 Stat. 38, 76 (2001). We suspect that, as the implementation of this rule draws nearer,
critics of Former I.R.C. § 1023 will undoubtedly use the same noncompliance fodder to attack
the viability of this revised carryover basis rule. See TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL WEALTH
TRANSFER TAXES, ABA, REPORT ON REFORM OF FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES 29-94
(2004) (presenting exhaustive technical critique of I.R.C. § 1022, but only devoting pages 83-
89 to nonsubstantive issues, mostly involving procedure rather than compliance issues). More
recently, the Senate has voiced its preference to maintain the estate tax, including the basis
equals fair market value rule at death. Dustin Stamper, Baucus, Kyl Agree on Estate Tax
Parameters, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 133-1 (2005).
12. There is no legally relevant determination of basis until after gain or loss is reported on
a tax return, despite the fact that basis depends on facts that occurred (possibly long) before the
sale or disposition that gives rise to the gain or loss. But it would be excessively burdensome to
have proceedings contemporaneous with such facts that would legally fix basis for the future
because (1) such facts are exceedingly numerous, (2) such basis may turn out to be irrelevant
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These systematic problems lead us in Part I to argue that inflated basis reporting is
occurring on a massive scale. There we look at record-keeping issues; the plethora of
rules affecting basis; the compliance obligations (or lack thereof) of third parties, tax
professionals, and taxpayers; the inability of the IRS to monitor compliance; and forces
impacting upon voluntary taxpayer compliance. Utilizing this background information,
we attempt to quantify the financial magnitude of the problem, estimating the amount
of forgone tax revenue resulting from basis overstatements. In Part II we describe our
reform proposals. Our principal recommendations are that Congress broaden third-
party reporting with respect to basis and taxable dispositions and, where third-party
reporting cannot do the job, taxpayers be made subject to a sanctionable duty to
establish tax basis. In addition, we argue that to facilitate tax basis reporting, Congress
should simplify certain substantive tax basis rules and consider other Code changes
that touch upon tax basis compliance issues. Since the suggested reform measures we
propose, if enacted, would not operate retroactively, we address the need for transition
rules in Part III. We conclude that the reforms we propose offer several mechanisms to
help enhance overall tax compliance, invigorating anew the strength of the income tax.
I. THE PROBLEM OF UNDERREPORTING NET GAiNs
In most transactions, determination of the amount realized is fairly routine: in
general, all that taxpayers must do is count the sales proceeds (cash plus the value of
any property received and liabilities assumed) 13 and subtract transaction costs, such as
selling commissions, if any. These facts are current and memorialized in documents
and records, such as closing statements, sales receipts, and broker reports. In the case
of marketable security and real estate sales, brokers readily supply this information to
the taxpayer on IRS Forms 1099-B and 1099-S, respectively, and simultaneously
submit these forms to the IRS. 14 However, sales and dispositions not involving
marketable securities and real estate are not subject to third-party reporting.
The situation with basis is markedly worse. In the Code, there is no explicit
requirement that a taxpayer keep accurate track of basis or that a third party supply
taxpayers or the IRS with such information. In addition, these rules are complex and
both compliance and enforcement incentives are weak.
These deficiencies in the tax system, combined with human nature, provide ample
occasion for taxpayers to overstate basis and (in some cases) to simply not report gain
transactions, whether by inadvertence or design. There is, thus, good reason to
hypothesize that compliance in this area is significantly worse than compliance with
most tax rules.
In Subpart A, we explore the five reasons taxpayers inadvertently or intentionally
inflate the basis they have in their assets. These reasons include (1) lax record-keeping
(e.g., where a personal-use asset is disposed of at a loss), (3) such basis may be rendered null by
a future event (such as death), and (4) the current revenue stake is small or nonexistent in
present-value terms.
13. If property other than rights to future cash is received, such property is taken into
account at its fair market value (FMV). Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (as amended in 2003).
14. Rev. Proc. 2004-50, 2004-33 I.R.B. 211 (2004); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'TOF
THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 1220: SPECIFICATIONS FOR FIING FORMS 1098,1099,5498 AND W-
2G ELECTRONICALLY OR MAGNETICALLY (2004); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS TO FoRM 1099, at GEN-4-5 (2004).
2006]
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requirements, (2) complex rules, (3) absence of compliance incentives, (4) IRS
disincentives to pursue basis inquiries, and (5) taxpayers' propensity to cheat. In
Subpart B, we attempt to quantify the fiscal damage done to the government's coffers
as a result of basis overstatements.
A. Reasons for Basis and Gain Reporting Noncompliance
There are two main reasons taxpayers would desire to overstate basis or to fail to
report gain transactions: tax savings and opportunity. The first reason is so obvious that
lengthy elaboration is unnecessary. The higher an asset's basis, the larger the potential
cost recovery associated with its use in a business or investment activity; furthermore,
the higher an asset's basis, the smaller the potential gain or the larger the potential loss.
Alternatively, failing to report a gain transaction is a form of nonreporting of income,
and it avoids even having to go through the motions of attempting to accurately report
basis.
The second reason taxpayers inflate basis or omit gain transactions is that they can
often do so with ease and impunity, for the reasons discussed below.
1. Lax Record-Keeping Requirements
When basis equals cost (or is derived from cost), its determination requires an
exercise of going back in time to ascertain the asset's initial net purchase price. This
purchase price is usually memorialized in a broker's statement, a closing statement, a
bill of sale, an invoice, or some other document or record (whether in paper or
electronic form) that has been preserved by, or is accessible to, the taxpayer.
Taxpayers are notoriously lax in keeping such records. Preservation of records is
neither a costless nor an effortless enterprise, as it requires a method of retrieval (a
filing system, index, or search mechanism), time, effort, and physical or electronic
space. Records can be lost or inadvertently destroyed due to home or office moves,
poor retrieval systems, the actions of others, computer malfunctions, and natural causes
such as floods. Records may also be destroyed by a taxpayer's conscious decision that
it is not worthwhile to keep basis-affecting records beyond the period of time one
keeps past tax returns and accompanying matter.1 5 Furthermore, the rule currently
governing testamentary dispositions of property mandates that, in the hands of the
recipient, the basis of such property equals its fair market value (FMV) at the
decedent's death; 16 thus, records may not be maintained or may even be destroyed due
to the expectation that issues of basis will become moot upon the asset-owner's death.
15. See, e.g., Mark Schwanhausser, Your Money: Paper Trail Leads to Peace of Mind, CHI.
TRiB., Feb. 24, 1997, at D3 (giving practical advice on how long to keep tax records).
16. I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1). Technically, the basis is the FMV on the date of death or, if the
alternate valuation date is elected for estate tax purposes, on the alternate valuation date. I.R.C.
§ 1014(a)(2). Even under the so-called carryover basis rule found in I.R.C. § 1022, currently
scheduled to take effect for decedents dying after 2009, the basis of property owned by all but
the wealthiest decedents will be the date-of-death FMV. More specifically, the decedent's basis
in assets (other than rights to "income in respect of a decedent") is adjusted upwards (but not in
excess of date-of-death FMV) by (1) $1.3 million (indexed for inflation) per decedent, (2) $3
million (indexed for inflation) for assets passing to the decedent's surviving spouse, (3)
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Having established that taxpayers may have a natural inclination to be less than
diligent when it comes to record keeping, the question is whether there is a
countervailing government-mandated duty on taxpayers to keep basis records, the
violation of which would be subject to penalties. But it turns out that whatever duty
might exist is so weak as to be virtually nonexistent in any practical sense. The Code
does impose an obligation on taxpayers to "keep such records... as the Secretary [of
the Treasury] may from time to time prescribe."' 7 However, the relevant Treasury
regulations do not explicitly impose a specific duty to keep basis records. 18
The general absence of a basis record-keeping mandate is echoed in the tax return
submission process. The Code requires an individual taxpayer to file an income tax
return if his or her gross income exceeds a specified threshold amount' 9 and further
requires taxpayers to "include therein the information required by such forms and
regulations."2 0 Schedule D of the Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) provides
spaces in which the bases of all assets sold or exchanged during the year are supposed
to be entered. The taxpayer would thus appear to have a duty to at least enter some
dollar figure in the appropriate space.21
However, Schedule D hardly gives adequate notice to taxpayers that basis
determinations are either important or potentially complex. The column in which the
basis figure is to be entered refers to "cost or other basis" and directs perplexed
unrealized business and investment losses of the decedent, and (4) unused net operating loss
(NOL) and capital loss carryovers of the decedent. See I.R.C. § 1022(b), (c), (d)(2), (4). Rights
to income in respect of a decedent (IRD), such as annuities and pension rights, obtain a pure
carryover basis with no basis adjustments. Thus, for a married decedent, all assets (other than
IRD rights) acquire a FMV basis unless aggregate unrealized appreciation exceeds $4.3 million
as indexed by inflation and augmented by NOL and capital loss carryovers.
17. I.R.C. § 6001.
18. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1 (as amended in 1990). The statute, however, does allow the
IRS, after notice to the taxpayer in question, to impose "specific" record-keeping requirements
upon such taxpayer. Id. at § 1.6001-1 (d). This requirement would likely come into play only for
a business taxpayer keeping sloppy books and records or an investor with a history of poor
record keeping. Thus, the IRS, in the course of an audit, may make a written request for taxpayer
information (including basis information). In extraordinary circumstances, the willful failure to
comply with such a request can give rise to criminal penalties. I.R.C. § § 7203 (willful failure to
supply information), 7210 (failure to obey summons).
19. I.R.C. § 6012(a).
20. I.R.C. §6011(a).
21. The Code imposes a penalty on a taxpayer's failure to file a return, I.R.C. § 6651 (a)(1),
but there is a "reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect" defense to this penalty. Id.
Moreover, the penalty is for failure to file the whole return, not for a failure to fill in a small
portion of a schedule that accompanies a return. Of course, this lesser kind of failure may, on
audit, induce the IRS to request such records as the taxpayer has, and the failure to supply the
requested information can give rise to the sanctions. The failure to supply information that the
taxpayer does not have, however, would not appear to fall under any of these requirements or
sanctions. Nevertheless, sanctions would likely apply in the case of a tax protester who has
avoided keeping basis records (or has neglected to file returns and schedules or to comply with
specific information requests) as a matter of principle. See I.R.C. § 6702 (penalty for frivolous
return). A penalty was assessed in Golub v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 367 (1999), on a
tax protestor who, inter alia, refused to enter any basis figure on Schedule D or to submit any
evidence of basis whatsoever.
2006]
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taxpayers, confused by the terseness of this reference, to the instructions.22 The
instructions pertaining specifically to Schedule D (Capital Gains and Losses) refer to
the concept of income tax basis and to various IRS publications that describe basis
rules, principally IRS Publication 551. But there is no requirement (akin to that found
under Code section 274(d) requiring all travel and entertainment expenses to be
substantiated) that basis be "substantiated" by records or other documents.
The instructions to Form 1040, under the heading "General Information," have a
short section entitled "How Long Should Records Be Kept?," stating that tax returns,
worksheets, and forms should be kept for three years; but records relating to property
should be kept longer insofar as they are relevant for determining basis.23 The
operative word here is should, not must. Another publication, IRS Publication 552 (as
revised October 1999), which is entitled "Recordkeeping for Individuals," is similarly
nonassertive. Page two of IRS Publication 552 states that "everybody should keep"
basis records for their homes, 24 but the publication says nothing about other property.25
Under "How Long to Keep Records," the same IRS publication states that basis
records should be kept until the period of limitations expires for the year in which one
disposes of the property. In none of these IRS publications or forms is it stated that
basis records must be kept.
In sum, there appears to be no government-mandated requirement, sanctionable in
itself, that taxpayers keep adequate basis records.26 In general, the IRS urges taxpayers
22. In the Instructions to Schedule D, the IRS amplifies the meaning of the phrase "other
basis." INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2005 INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE
D, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i 1 040sd.pdf [hereinafter IRS INSTRUCTIONS FOR
SCHEDULE D]; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 551:
BASIS OF ASSETS (May 2002); Sales and Trades ofInvestment Property, in INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 550: INVESTMENT INCOME AND EXPENSES
(INCLUDING CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES) (2003) (offering additional assistance to taxpayers to
help them identify their tax basis in marketable securities).
23. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1040,
at 63 (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040gi.pdf [hereinafter IRS
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1040].
24. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREAsURY, PUBuCATION 552: RECORDKEEPING
FOR INDIVIDUALS (Rev. Oct. 1999) 2 (1999). This reference to the basis of homes is odd because
the gains on most sales of principal residences are permanently exempt from tax. See I.R.C. §
121 (excluding the first $250,000 of gain, or $500,000 in the case of married taxpayers filing
joint tax returns, from income taxation on the sale or exchange of property that the taxpayer has
owned and used as the taxpayer's principal residence for a period of two years or more during
the five-year period ending on the date of the sale or exchange).
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-1(g) (as amended in 1971), however, states that donors and
donees "should" keep such records as are relevant to figuring the donee's basis. But most of the
relevant information (if accurate) is on Form 709 (the gift tax return), which is not available to
the donee as a matter of right! Curiously, the corresponding duty with respect to I.R.C. § 1041
(transfers to a spouse or to an ex-spouse pursuant to a divorce) is couched in mandatory terms.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1 T, Q&A (14) (as amended in 2003) (describing transferor's duty to
supply transferee with records in a transfer under I.R.C. § 1041).
26. With respect to property subject to a uniform basis, Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(c) (1960) is
one of the few places in either the Code or regulations that purport to "require" that basis
adjustment records be kept. It would appear, however, that this requirement is satisfied by filing
the fiduciary income tax return (Form 1041), which entails the reporting of transactions relating
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to keep such records for the taxpayer's self-interest, but this urging is mostly hortatory,
not mandatory. Taxpayers have a duty to file returns and accompanying schedules, but
the failure to enter basis figures on Schedule D can, at worst, only attract IRS attention
and a possible request for specifics.
27
Where does the absence of a record-keeping mandate lead taxpayers with respect to
basis determinations? Ordinarily being unable to rely on their records (due to being
incomplete or nonexistent), taxpayers are put in the awkward position of having to
make estimates or, worse, uninformed "guesses." And it is plausible to assume that
when taxpayers act in this fashion, they would, out of self-interest, give the benefit of
their computational doubts to themselves rather than to the government.
2. Complex Rules
During the cycle of asset ownership, the Code enlists taxpayers to initially
determine and subsequently adjust the basis they have in their assets. These basis rules
are often complex, arcane, and obtuse, creating the double effect of clouding basis
determinations and providing opportunities for taxpayers to inflate basis.
a. Initial Basis Determinations
Ascertaining an asset's initial basis is not necessarily an easy task. Even the
implementation of the most simple basis rule-that basis equals cost2 ---can pose
difficulties, depending on the facts surrounding acquisition and subsequent disposition
of the asset.29
to estate or trust property. The term uniform basis literally means that the basis of property
received by gratuitous transfer is the same whether the property is held by an individual, a trust,
or an estate; and, in the context of an estate or trust, it is synonymous with "inside" basis (that
is, the basis of estate or trust assets), as distinct from the "outside" basis in trust or estate
interests held by beneficiaries (such outside basis, where relevant, being subject to actuarial
adjustments). Apart from Form 1041, there appears to be no form or schedule for reporting
uniform basis adjustments.
27. Analytically, there are three possible scenarios: (1) the taxpayer is clueless and makes a
guess as to basis that she thinks is within the realm of possibility (although virtually certain to
be incorrect); (2) the taxpayer has some evidence relating to basis, but the figure entered is
likely to be incorrect; and, (3) the taxpayer knows the correct basis figure but enters another
figure (or a figure outside of the range of possible basis figures). The first two scenarios can lead
to negligence and accuracy-related penalties, and the third can lead not only to those penalties
but also can rise to the level of civil and criminal fraud. At this point in the discussion, we are
focusing only on the first two scenarios, which derive from inadequate records.
28. I.R.C. § 1012.
29. For example, if marketable securities are purchased in a series of transactions, it is
necessary to "identify" the basis of such securities when they are subsequently sold (assuming
that all of the taxpayer's securities are not sold in the same taxable year). This problem is
familiar to business taxpayers who are required to cope with inventories, for which well-known
accounting conventions, namely, last-in/first-out (LIFO) and first-in/first-out (FIFO), are
available to produce a basis number for sold inventory. Stock of the same class of the same
corporation is wholly fungible, regardless of when acquired. Therefore, it would be suitable to
subject such stock to either the FIFO or LIFO conventions, or, better yet, a blended-basis
(average cost) convention under which the basis for any share would be the aggregate cost of all
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Thus, even purchased assets do not necessarily start with an initial basis equal to
their cost. Consider, for example, the fact that any cost-derived basis is increased by
transaction costs borne by the purchaser,30 which can sometimes occur in one or more
years subsequent to the actual acquisition.3 1 Sales taxes, too, are to be added to basis.32
Finally, assets purchased before March 1, 1913 (i.e., the inception date of the income
tax), have an initial basis equal to the greater of adjusted cost basis on that date or the
FMV on that date. 3
Aside from purchases, taxpayers can acquire assets in a myriad of other ways (e.g.,
as in-kind income or by way of bequest, gift, or interspousal transfer). In these
circumstances, assets do not acquire an initial cost basis, and the taxpayer must be
aware of the applicable basis rule in addition to having access to relevant records.
Assets received in-kind (e.g., as remuneration for services rendered) that are in fact
properly included in the gross income of a taxpayer acquire an initial basis equal to the
amount included in income, 4 which is supposed to be the FMV of the asset when
acquired. 5
shares divided by the number of such shares. But, contrary to logic and practical considerations,
the general rule is one of actual identification of the shares sold. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-
I (c)(1) (as amended in 1996). When the specific identification method cannot be followed, the
backup rule is FIFO, which (being a technical accounting convention) the typical individual
investor may not be either able or willing to grasp. Id.
30. Woodward v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572,575 (1970); Spreckels v. Comm'r, 315 U.S. 626
(1942). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(e) (as amended in 1987) (stating that brokerage
commissions must be capitalized in basis); Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(b) (as amended in 1996)
(stating that real estate taxes paid by purchaser are included in the tax basis of the acquired real
estate). The costs of acquiring a gratuitous transfer, however, are not added to basis. Rather, if a
transferee incurs costs in acquiring a gratuitous transfer, the Code treats the transaction as a part-
sale/part-gift; thus the transferee's basis is the greater of cost (including transaction costs) or
gratuitous transferee's basis under any of I.R.C. §§ 1014, 1015, and 1041. Treas. Reg. § 1. 1015-
4 (as amended in 1972).
31. See Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(k) (as amended in 1975) (stating that the costs of perfecting
and defending title must be capitalized).
32. See I.R.C. § 164(a) (third sentence). I.R.C. § 164(b)(5) (applicable for taxable years
beginning in 2004 and 2005, American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-357, § 501(b),
118 Stat. 1418, 1520-21 (2004)) allows a current deduction for state and local sales taxes (in
lieu of income taxes) even if related to personal consumption and personal-use assets. It is not
clear if a person deducting sales taxes in lieu of income taxes must still capitalize sales taxes on
business and investment assets, but it is clear that the latter must be capitalized if the taxpayer
forgoes any deduction of sales taxes. In any event, it seems likely that sales taxes on consumer
assets (including artworks and collectibles) that are deducted will often end up being capitalized
as well.
33. See I.R.C. § 1053. This rule would rarely apply in the case of individual taxpayers, but
in the case of corporations, this rule remains relevant.
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.61 -2(d)(2)(i) (as amended in 2003) ("In computing the gain or loss from
the subsequent sale of such property, its basis shall be the amount paid for the property
increased by the amount of such difference included in gross income.").
35. See I.R.C. § 83(a) (prescribing inclusion of property transferred to service provider in
gross income at FMV); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003). On the other hand,
investments that are expensed have an initial basis of zero. Examples of zero basis property
include deductible contributions to individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and business and
tangible personal property expensed under I.R.C. § 179. It is plausible to assume that taxpayers
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Assets acquired by reason of the death of another person (if properly includible in
the decedent's gross estate) usually (but not always) 36 acquire a basis equal to their
date-of-death value37 unless the decedent's personal representative makes an alternate
valuation date election.38 The vast majority of estates do not have to file estate tax
returns,39 and bequests do not constitute gross income.40 Thus, there is no universal
will sometimes erroneously claim FMV-at-acquisition basis even in cases where the in-kind
income was not reported. In this situation, there is old authority that may be (mis)interpreted by
a tax adviser to mean that the property's basis in the taxpayer's hands should be its FMV on
acquisition even though the receipt of such property was erroneously excluded from gross
income. See Comm'r v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106, 109 (1936); Bennet v. Comm'r, 137 F.2d 537,
538-39 (2d Cir. 1943); Countway v. Comm'r, 127 F.2d 69, 73-76 (1st Cir. 1942). However,
these cases merely held (or assumed) that the doctrine of estoppel (an equitable remedy) did not
apply in this situation where the erroneous exclusion was not correctable due to the running of
the statute of limitations. It is now recognized, as a matter of law, that basis cannot be supported
by an erroneous exclusion. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 98, 101-03
(1943); Comm'r v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 243-45 (1937); Charley v. Comm'r, 91 F.3d 72, 74-
75 (9th Cir. 1996); Cont'l Oil v. Jones, 177 F.2d 508,512 (10th Cir. 1949); Comm'rv. Timken,
141 F.2d 625, 627, 630 (6th Cir. 1944). Cf Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489, 493, 503-04
(1943) (holding that basis determinations are not subject to bar under the statute of limitations).
Nevertheless, at least one commentator continues to insist that basis-equals-acquisition-date
FMV even when the asset is erroneously excluded, unless the government can successfully
apply the so-called mitigation provisions of I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314. See Steven J. Willis, The Tax
Benefit Rule: A Different Rule and a Unified Theory of Error Correction, 42 FLA. L. REV. 575,
642 (1990).
36. There is one major exception to the basis-equals-FMV rule found under I.R.C. § 1014.
Income in respect of a decedent (IRD) rights (these rights refer to income items earned but not
received by a decedent prior to death) take a carryover basis that is usually zero. See I.R.C. §
1014(c). Annuities, survivor rights under IRAs, employee retirement plans, and installment
obligations are all treated as IRD rights. I.R.C. § 691(d). Note that by definition, IRD has not
been included in gross income by the decedent prior to death, and as such these amounts cannot
create or support basis. Hence, any carryover basis in an IRD right would derive from the
decedent's basis in such right, such as annuity premiums and nondeductible taxpayer
contributions (if any) to employee plans and IRAs.
37. I.R.C. § 1014(a). I.R.C. § 1014 is scheduled to yield to a complex carryover basis
system with significant FMV-at-death exceptions for decedents dying in 2010 (and possibly
thereafter). See I.R.C. § 1022, critiqued in Joseph M. Dodge, What's Wrong with Carryover
Basis, Especially the Carryover Basis Provisions of H.R. 8, 91 TAX NoTEs 961 (2001).
38. See I.R.C. § 2032. This election can only be made if an estate tax return is filed and the
alternate valuation would result in a decreased estate tax. Thus, the election cannot properly be
made for the purpose of increasing income tax basis. See I.R.C. § 2032(c).
39. Because only roughly 5% of decedents' estates must file an estate tax return, see
Charles Davenport & Jay A. Soled, Enlivening the Death-Tax Death-Talk, 84 TAX NOTES 591,
594 (1999), the vast majority of other estates have no occasion to record date-of-death values
related to the decedent's assets unless there is a duty imposed under a state death tax regime.
Due to the scheduled increases in the Applicable Credit Amount, see I.R.C. § 2010(c)
(increasing the exclusion amount to $3.5 million in the year 2009), even fewer estates will likely
have occasion to file federal estate tax returns in the future. See Terry Manzi, Projections of
Returns That Will Be Filed in Calendar Years 2004-2010, SOI BuLL. 2003-2004,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/O4proj.pdf (projecting a steep decline in the number of estate tax
returns that decedents' estates will file over the next half decade).
40. I.R.C. § 102(a).
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mechanism for reporting the facts that establish basis. It follows that even honest
taxpayers must resign themselves to estimating (long after the fact) the basis of assets
acquired by reason of a decedent's death, and dishonest taxpayers have a wide-open
opportunity to "make up" a high basis for such assets.
41
Assets transferred by inter vivos gift are subject to a carryover basis rule (meaning
that the transferor's basis carries over to the transferee), 42 but gifts of property having a
date-of-gift FMV below the donor's basis have a "floating" basis that is contingent on
the donee's selling price of the asset.43 Also, gifts of appreciated property for which a
gift or generation-skipping transfer tax is paid obtain an upward basis adjustment.44 It
is likely that many donees are not aware of these complicated rules, and, if they are
aware, they lack the information (much less the will) to comply with them.4 5
Gifts, sales, and exchanges between a husband and wife while married or pursuant
to a divorce are nonrecognition transactions subject to a mandatory carryover basis
rule." Even this seemingly straightforward rule, however, might often be
misunderstood or ignored, particularly with respect to sales or exchanges between
current and former spouses (which can easily be mistaken as being subject to the "cost
basis" rule).
Finally, whenever a taxpayer acquires an asset pursuant to a nonrecognition event,
the determination of an asset's initial tax basis can present a daunting challenge.
Consider, for example, each of the following nonrecognition events: (1) property
received in-kind from a trust or estate,47 (2) securities (and commodity futures)
acquired in a "wash sale, '48 and (3) property acquired in a tax-free, like-kind
41. The Instructions to Schedule D state that the taxpayer acquiring property from a
decedent is to write the word inherited in the "acquisition date" column of Schedule D, line 8.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INsTRUCTIONS TO SCHEDULE D, at D-6
(2004). However, this instruction probably exists because of I.R.C. § 1223(11), which treats all
gains and losses on property acquired from a decedent as being long-term, thereby rendering the
acquisition date irrelevant for that purpose. But omitting the actual acquisition date for property
acquired from a decedent actually renders it more difficult for a return examiner to identify a
possible basis overstatement in these cases. A high basis claim for an asset (especially stock)
acquired long ago should raise an examiner's suspicions.
42. I.R.C. § 1015(a). For a general overview of this rule, see James B. Lewis, Exploring
Section 1015 and Related Topics, 43 TAx LAW. 241 (1990).
43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-1(a)(1), (2) (as amended in 1971).
44. The adjustment is equal to the gift and generation-skipping transfer taxes attributable to
the unrealized appreciation. See I.R.C. §§ 1015(d)(6), 2654(a).
45. The basis rules described in the previous footnote for gratuitous transfers are further
modified in the case of life, term, or remainder interests. If a remainder interest is sold, the
seller's basis is the original I.R.C. § 1014 (or I.R.C. § 1015) basis, multiplied by the actuarial
factor, determined at the time of sale, keyed to the duration or life of the income or term interest.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-5 (as amended in 1994). Income or term interests received by gratuitous
transfer have a basis of zero. I.R.C. §§ 273, 1001(e)(1).
46. I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2).
47. The property is likely to have the same basis in the distributee's hands as it did in the
hands of the trust or estate. See I.R.C. § 643(e)(1). If, however, the fiduciary makes a special
election, the property could have an FMV-at-distribution basis. I.R.C. § 643(e)(3).
48. A "wash sale" occurs when stock, securities, or commodities are sold by an investor at a
loss and substantially identical assets are acquired within thirty days. I.R.C. § 1091(a). Such
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exchange. 49 Each one of these nonrecognition events involves very technical tax basis
rules that few taxpayers (or their advisers) will have the patience, willpower, or energy
to peruse and then apply.
5 0
b. Basis Adjustments and Changes
Once acquired, assets can be subject to several basis adjustments, both upward and
downward. It is not always easy to discern when taxpayers are supposed to make these
adjustments. Consider the fact that upward basis adjustments are allowed for
"improvements," but not for "repairs." 51 Yet distinguishing between repairs and
improvements is often a difficult task in itself as the tests themselves are imprecise.
5 2
The Code does offer several "precise" adjustments that are no less challenging to
apply. In general, upward adjustments are required for income and gain inclusions
accruing to original issue discount (OID) instruments,5 3 interests in pass-through
entities,54 and mark-to-market investments." In addition, interests in entities treated as
securities are supposed to have a basis determined with reference to the shares disposed of at a
loss, I.R.C. § 109 1(d), which is supposed to go unrecognized. See I.R.C. § 109 1(a).
49. Under I.R.C. § 1031, the basis of the acquired property is the same as the transferor's
basis in the transferred property subject to adjustments on account of gain (or loss) recognized,
boot received (or given), and changes in mortgage debt. See I.R.C. § 1031 (b), (d). A similar set
of rules applies in the case of involuntary conversions under I.R.C. § 1033. See generally I.R.C.
§ 1033(b).
50. Form 8824 exists for reporting like-kind exchanges. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, FoRM 8824 (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8824.pdf.
However, the index to the Instructions to Form 1040 makes no reference to either "exchanges"
or "like-kind exchanges"; Form 8824, however, is mentioned in fine print (along with much else
in the lengthy Instructions to Schedule D, p. D-1, and on Schedule D itself in lines 4 and 11).
IRS INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1040, supra note 23; IRS INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE D, supra
note 22; DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SCHEDULE D (FORM 1040) (2005), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fl 040sd.pdf [hereinafter IRS SCHEDULE D]. Form 8824 provides
for a basis computation of the acquired property. However, since the description of the property
can be vague, there is no way for the IRS to use this basis information on its own. The
Instructions for Schedule D (2005) state that "you may not be able to use the actual cost as the
basis" in the case of property acquired by inheritance, gift, tax-free exchange, involuntary
conversion, or wash sale, but there is no explanation of the basis rules for such property in the
Form 1040 instructions themselves. Moreover, the instructions state that a separate explanation
of the basis figure must be provided if actual cost is not used. IRS INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE
D, supra, at D-6. Thus, a conscientious taxpayer is left with the possibility of consulting a Form
8824 filed with a prior return, but this process could entail unappealing complexities.
Consequently, the path of least resistance is to enter a basis number without an explanation.
51. See I.R.C. § 1016(a).
52. Compare Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 635 (1950) (costs
associated with adding a concrete liner to taxpayer's basement held a deductible repair), with
Mt. Morris Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 272 (1955), affd, 238 F.2d 85 (6th Cir.
1956) (addition of a drainage system held to a nondeductible capital expenditure). See
generally, Peter L. Faber, Indopco: The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 TAX LAW. 607, 607 (1994)
("One of the recurring problems in tax law is the difficult distinction between expenses that can
be deducted when incurred and those that must be capitalized.").
53. See I.R.C. § 1272(d)(2).
54. See I.R.C. § 705(a)(1) (partner's basis in a partnership interest); I.R.C. § 1367(a)(1)
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partnerships for tax purposes have an upward basis adjustment on account of an
increase in partnership liabilities.1
6
In the Code, there exist many corollaries to these upward basis adjustments in the
form of downward basis adjustments. These are required for distributions, losses, and
deductions (such as depreciation, amortization, and depletion) 57 accruing to such
investments as (1) assets held for use in the taxpayer's trade or business, (2) interests
held in pass-through entities,5 8 and (3) mark-to-market assets.5 9 Also, the "outside"
basis in interests in entities treated as partnerships for tax purposes must be
correspondingly reduced when there is a decrease in partnership liabilities.
60
In the case of interests in entities (including publicly traded stock), basis is affected
by "capital changes" in the entity.6' Thus, in the case of a "stock split," the presplit
basis is supposed to be reallocated among the new shares on a pro rata basis. 62 A
similar rule exists in the case of an excludible stock dividend.63 In the case of a
corporate division (such as a spin-off), recapitalization, merger, or acquisition, the
shareholders may end up with stock of one or more corporations other than (or in
addition to) the shares of the initial corporation. If the transaction involves a tax-free
exchange or distribution of stock,64 the shareholder's original basis, as adjusted upward
(shareholder's basis in S-corporation stock).
55. See I.R.C. § 1256(a)(2). There is an obscure but broadly applicable one-time election
for appreciated investments held by the taxpayer on January 1,2001. This election, potentially
available for virtually all investments of a noncorporate taxpayer, is contained in section 31 (e)
of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, which is not in the Code
but which was brought to the attention of taxpayers by the IRS. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2001 INSTRUCTIONS TO FORM 1040 D-2 (2002), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1O40sd--2001 .pdf. The Job Creation and Worker Assistance
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 414, 116 Stat. 2 1, retroactively amended section 311 (e) of
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 to clarify that a taxpayer may not use Code section 121 to
exclude gain on a principal residence resulting from a mark-to-market election.
56. See I.R.C. § 752(a).
57. See I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2).
58. See I.R.C. § 705(a)(2) (partner's basis in a partnership interest); I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)
(shareholder's basis in S-corporation stock).
59. See I.R.C. § 1256(a)(2).
60. See I.R.C. § 752(b).
61. See Carolyn Hartwell, Russell H. Hereth & John C. Talbott, Unraveling a Stock's Basis
Is Not Necessarily Basic, 70 PRAc. TAx STRATEGIES 356 (2003) (describing the myriad events
that can result in complex tax basis adjustments with no contemporaneous IRS reporting
requirement). In contrast, consider the reporting requirements associated with ownership of
depreciable assets. Taxpayers must annually adjust their tax bases in these assets, see I.R.C. §
1016(a), and report the sums of these adjustments on Form 4562. INTERNAL REVENUE SERv.,
DEP'T OF THE TREAsURY, FORM 4562 (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f4562.pdf.
62. See I.R.C. § 358(a)(1).
63. See I.R.C. §§ 305(a), 307(a). In cases when a corporation distributes stock rights that
are less than 15% of the FMV of the old stock at the time of distribution, a taxpayer may elect
not to reallocate tax basis. I.R.C. § 307(b). However, if the stock dividend is taxable under
I.R.C. § 305(b)-(c), the stock received is includible in gross income and acquires a basis equal to
its FMV on distribution with no adjustment to the basis in the original shares. See I.R.C. §
301(d).
64. See I.R.C. § 354 (requiring a "reorganization" as defined in I.R.C. § 368); I.R.C. § 355
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for any gain recognized and downward for any boot received, is to be reallocated
among the "resulting" shares in proportion to their respective FMVs. 5 Stock shares or
securities received in a taxable exchange should have a basis equal to their FMVs at
the time of the exchange." This rule also applies to in-kind boot, whether received in a
taxable or tax-free exchange.67
While transactions of the type described in the preceding paragraph may occur
fairly often during a sustained period of equity ownership, there are other capital-
change transactions that occur less frequently but also implicate basis. A nondividend
corporate distribution (i.e., when the corporate enterprise has no earnings and profits) 6"
in cash or in-kind reduces basis in the stock to the extent thereof, and any distribution
in excess of basis yields capital gain. 69 The liquidation of a corporation is a taxable
event to both the corporation and the shareholder,70 meaning that the basis of any
property received by an ex-shareholder is its FMV at the time of liquidation. 7' Finally,
the creation of a corporation with in-kind contributions entails the replication of the
shareholder's basis at both the shareholder and corporate levels.72
Capital changes that cause resulting basis adjustments are not limited to corporate
investments. Similar adjustments apply with respect to pass-through entities and
interests therein.73
(corporate divisions).
65. See I.R.C. § 358; Treas. Reg. § 1.358-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1995).
66. See Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 166, 172 (1954)
(holding that basis in taxable exchange of property received is the FMV of property received,
not the FMV of property given).
67. See Treas. Reg. § 1.358-1(a) (as amended in 2002) (last sentence).
68. A nondividend distribution is a distribution by a corporation that has exhausted its post-
1913 earnings and profits. See I.R.C. § 316 (defining dividend distribution).
69. I.R.C. § 301(c)(2)-(3). If the distribution is in-kind, the distribution is treated as "at"
FMV, which is also the basis of the property in the hands of the distributee. See § 301(b), (c)(2),
(d).
70. See I.R.C. §§ 331, 336.
71. I.R.C. § 334(a).
72. Assuming the transfer qualifies (in whole or in part) as a tax-free exchange under I.R.C.
§ 351, the transferor's basis in the stock and the corporation's basis in the assets are both based
on the transferor's basis. See I.R.C. §§ 358(a), 362(a).
73. Application of the basis rules for pass-through entities and interests therein requires
constant attention. It has already been noted that the tax basis in interests classified as
partnerships for tax purposes is (1) adjusted annually for passed-through profits and losses, (2)
reduced by distributions, and (3) altered by changes in partnership liabilities. See supra notes
55, 57, 60. Basis is also increased by capital infusions from equity holders. See I.R.C. § 722. In
the case of a nonliquidating in-kind distribution, the distributee's basis in the property received
is the tax partnership's inside basis (not to exceed the partner's outside basis reduced by any
cash received), see I.R.C. § 732(a), and the distributee's outside basis is reduced by the same
amount as the partner's basis in the distributed property. See I.R.C. § 733. Outside basis is the
equity holder's basis in her tax partnership interest; inside basis is the predistribution basis of an
asset, the ownership of which is held by the tax partnership. When a tax partnership is liquidated
in-kind, the distributee's basis in the property is the same as her outside basis (rather than
inside) basis, reduced by any cash received. See I.R.C. § 732(b). The tax partnership interest no
longer exists. Subchapter S corporation stock is subject to basis rules similar to those of tax
partnerships, except there is no adjustment with respect to Subchapter S corporation liabilities.
In addition, in-kind distributions, whether liquidating or nonliquidating, are treated according to
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To illustrate the difficulties the tax basis identification process may engender,
consider a case study involving stock ownership in AT&T, once the most widely held
stock in the United States. 74 Suppose A, in 1982, held 100 shares of common stock in
AT&T with a $1000 aggregate tax basis (or $10 per share). In the ensuing years,
AT&T experienced the following capital-change events: a divestiture, two corporate
spin-offs, a stock split, a corporate split-off, a spin-off, and, finally, a reverse stock
split. As a result of these events, by the year 2004 A would own thirty shares of
common stock in AT&T with a tax basis of $1.89 per share. In addition, she would
hold stock in eleven other companies, 75 each of which may have made stock
the rules applicable for Subchapter C corporations. See I.R.C. §§ 1367(a), 1368.
74. Jill Bettner, Small Holders Think AT&TIs Still Safe Bet, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1982, §2,
at 33 ("With 3.1 million shareholders, AT&T is the nation's most widely held stock.").
75. On January 1, 1984, AT&T shareholders each received one share in seven regional Bell
operating companies for every ten shares of AT&T owned on the record date of December 30,
1983. A's tax basis should have been allocated 28.50% to AT&T (i.e., $285 or $2.85 per share)
and the remaining 71.50% as follows: Ameritech (10.33%), Bell Atlantic (10.49%), Bell South
(13.53%), NYNEX (9.84%), Pacific Telesis Group (8.88%), Southwestern Bell (9.49%), and
US West (8.94%). Next, AT&T shareholders of record on September 17, 1996, received a
distribution of 0.324084 shares of common stock of Lucent Technologies, Inc., for every share
of AT&T stock owned. (AT&T shareholders entitled to a fractional share of Lucent
Technologies, Inc., received a cash payment instead.) As a result of this distribution, A's tax
basis should have been allocated 72.01% to her AT&T shares (i.e., $205.23 or $2.05 per share)
and 27.99% to the Lucent Technologies, Inc., shares, including any fractional share ownership.
Next, AT&T shareholders of record on December 13, 1996, received a distribution of 0.0625
shares of common stock of NCR Corp. for every share of AT&T stock owned. (AT&T
shareholders entitled to a fractional share of NCR Corp. received a cash payment instead.) As a
result of this distribution, A's tax basis should have been allocated 95.23% to her AT&T shares
(i.e., $195.44 or $1.95 per share) and 4.77% to the NCR Corp. shares, including any fractional
share ownership. Next, as a result of a three-for-two stock split on April 15, 1999, AT&T
shareholders received one additional share of stock for every two shares owned on the record
date of March 31, 1999. Cash was received in lieu of any fractional share, unless the
shareholders participated in the AT&T Dividend Reinvestment and Stock Purchase Plan
(DRSPP) on the record date; in that case, all whole and fractional shares were credited to their
DRSPP account. As a result of this stock split, A's $195.44 tax basis in her AT&T shares would
be divided by the total number of her new AT&T shares, resulting in a tax basis of $1.30 per
share ($195.44/150). Next, AT&T shareholders of record on June 22, 2001, received a
distribution of 0.3218 shares of common stock of AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., for every
AT&T share owned. (AT&T shareholders entitled to a fractional share of AT&T Wireless
Services, Inc., received a cash payment instead.) As a result of this distribution, A's tax basis
should have been allocated 77.66% to her AT&T shares (i.e., $151.78 or $1.01 per share) and
22.34% to the AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., including any fractional share ownership. Next,
AT&T shareholders of record on November 18, 2001, received a distribution of one share of
common stock of AT&T Broadband Corp. for every AT&T share owned. (As a result of a
merger, all shares of AT&T Broadband Corp. stock were converted into Comcast Corporation.)
As a result of this distribution, A's tax basis should have been allocated 37.4% to her AT&T
shares (i.e., $56.77 or 0.38 per share) and 62.6% to the AT&T Broadband Corp. Finally, as a
result of a one-to-five reverse stock split on November 18, 2002, AT&T shareholders received
one share of AT&T stock in exchange for every five AT&T shares owned on that date. (Cash
was received in lieu of any fractional share unless the shareholder participated in the DRSPP; in
that case, all fractional shares were credited to her DRSPP account.) As a result of this stock
reverse, A's total tax basis in her AT&T shares (i.e., $56.77) would be divided by the total
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distributions and experienced several corporate restructuring events of its own.76
Although there are websites that deal with these complicated basis issues, a taxpayer
must be willing to make the effort, know how to access these sites, and be able to enter
the relevant data."
To summarize the foregoing, a good-faith inquiry into basis requires both the
finding of accurate historical records and access to advice or information about the
legal significance of assorted basis rules pertaining to capital changes and various types
of transactions and events. As to historical research, basis might well derive from the
acts of another party (such as in the case of gifts and bequests), that may be
unavailable, deceased, or, in the case of an estate, trust, or other entity, nonexistent. In
many cases, basis records will be lost or inaccessible.
As to the legal significance of basis facts, one must start with the instructions to
Schedule D of the individual income tax return (Form 1040). The instructions take up
about nine pages of very small print laid out in three columns and cross-referenced to
the general discussion of basis rules found in IRS Publication 551, as well as to several
more-specialized IRS publications, schedules, and forms (and instructions to such
schedules and forms). 78 For a tax-savvy person, an alternative to the IRS publications,
forms, schedules, and instructions is the Bureau of National Affairs Tax Management
Portfolio describing basis rules.79
Having obtained and digested the necessary facts and relevant rules, the civic-
minded taxpayer would next need to muster the will, time, and effort to "put it all
together" so as to correctly fill out the tax return. s The mere mechanics of correctly
filling out Schedule D can be extremely onerous, as Schedule D requires that a gain or
loss computation be made for each asset disposition.8' First, the matching of purchase
and sale information would inevitably be quite time-consuming. Second, if the taxpayer
has engaged in dozens, hundreds, or thousands of trades during the year, reams of
Schedule D pages would need to be submitted, even though the gains and losses on
numerous items might be quite small. Third, gains and losses have to be broken down
into numerous specific categories such as capital versus ordinary gains and losses,
number of her new AT&T shares (i.e., thirty), resulting in a tax basis of $1.89 per share. See
James Schembari, AT&Tx 1.176 - $15 + Yes, More Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2004 at
C9; Jane J. Kim, A T&Tlnvestors Face Tax Headache, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2005, at D 1. AT&T
and other corporations have websites that assist in the computation of basis. See AT&T, Investor
Relations: Tax Basis Information, http://www.att.com/ir/ss/tbi (last visited Sept. 23, 2005).
76. For example, as a result of holding 100 shares in AT&T, Taxpayer A in the prior
example, supra note 75, would have received seven shares in BellSouth. Over the next two
decades, shareholders in BellSouth experienced four stock splits, each of which resulted in a
shareholder tax basis adjustment. To compute these tax basis adjustments, see BELLSOUTH, A
GUIDE TO COMPUTING TAX BASIS, http://www.bellsouth.comfinvestor/irshareholder_
taxbasis.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2005).
77. See James Schembari, The Cost Basis in the Haystack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,2004 at C8.
78. See IRS INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE D, supra note 22.
79. See Maule, supra note 3.
80. See Ken Kies, Capitol Hill Veteran: 'I Still Hate Doing My Taxes,' WASH. POST, Mar.
2, 2003, at H 1I (former chief of staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation
commenting about his disdain for completing his annual tax return).
81. When there are changes in control or recapitalizations, this requirement is relaxed. In
completing Form 1099-B, brokers can aggregate all proceeds (cash, stock, and other property)
resulting from these events. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-3T(d) (as corrected in 2004).
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long-term versus short-term capital gains, "collectibles" gains and losses, "non-
recaptured Code section 1250 gains," Code section 1231 gains and losses, and so on,
some of which are separately reportable on Forms 4684,4797,6252,6781, and 8824.
Then all of these results have to be added up, sorted out, and processed. Even though
many of the arithmetical operations can be handled by tax return computer programs,
simply entering the data correctly is a formidable task in itself.
In sum, it is a truly heroic assumption that taxpayers (and their advisors) can
comprehend the basis rules and apply them. In fact, unlike most other rules in the
Code, the government essentially leaves to chance the comprehension and application
of such rules.
3. Absence of Compliance Incentives
For those who lack compliance zeal, there are few incentives (by way of "carrot" or
"stick") to ensure accurate basis and gain reporting. More specifically, third parties are
indifferent to tax basis concerns insofar as they have no reporting obligations, the
standards of practice established by the American Bar Association (ABA) and the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) implicitly discourage
basis inquiries, and taxpayers often harbor a nonchalant attitude toward basis in
recognition of the fact that their chances of being audited on this issue are virtually
nonexistent.
a. Third-Party Reporting Obligations
Third-party reporting of basis information is virtually nonexistent.8 2 Although Code
section 6041(a) requires the issuance of information returns by payors for certain
payments, this requirement only applies if the payor is a business and the payment (a)
is in the amount of $600 or more; (b) is made in the course of such business; and (c)
constitutes compensation, rent, or other "fixed and determinable profit, gain, or
income" of the payee.83 However, a seller's amount realized that is attributable to a
payment fits into none of these categories, 84 and it is fairly safe to say that asset
82. One of the few provisions relating to basis reporting is Code section 1060, relating to
taxable business acquisitions, where the buyer is supposed to inform the IRS of allocations of
the purchase price of intangibles and other assets relevant to Code section 197. I.R.C. § 1060(b).
Taxpayers are to enter these allocations on Form 8594. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1 (e)(1)(i) (as
amended in 2004). This form, however, only requires a breakdown of the aggregate amount of
consideration allocated to each asset category; thus, the buyer's asset-by-asset tax basis remains
shrouded in mystery. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FoRM 8594 (Rev.
Oct. 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8594.pdf. Code section 6043 imposes a
reporting obligation on a corporation with regard to liquidations, reorganizations, and other
changes in capital structure. Despite this reporting obligation, Form 1099-CAP, which is the
vehicle for fulfilling this obligation, makes no reference to shareholder basis, which would not
be known by the corporation. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FoRM
1099-CAP (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1099cap.pdf.
83. See I.R.C. § 6041(a).
84. The phrase fixed and determinable is lifted from the phrase fixed or determinable,
annual or periodical, found in I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881(a), 1441(a). Clearly, the latter phrase was
designed to exclude capital gains because the payor/buyer has no means of ascertaining the
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purchases are generally excluded under section 6041.85 Direct third-party basis
reporting to the IRS would, if nothing else, put taxpayers on notice that the IRS
possesses such information and that filling in the blanks on Schedule D with made-up
numbers might be somewhat risky, despite the fact that the IRS at present has no means
by which to match basis information with subsequent sale information.
8 6
Third-party reporting requirements for sales, exchanges, and other dispositions (all
of which would at least posit the existence of a basis issue) are grossly inadequate.
Along these lines, Code section 6045 is the most relevant information-reporting
provision. It imposes an obligation on a broker87 to file an information return "with
such details regarding gross proceeds and other information as the Secretary by forms
and regulations may require."8 8 However, this provision only covers brokered sales and
is further limited to brokered sales of real estate and securities and other exchange-
traded items.89 Important sectors of the economy thus avoid third-party reporting of
seller/payee's basis. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(l)-(2) (as amended in 2000). There is no
other mention of"gain" in the section 6041 regulations and no example involving a scenario in
which the payee would have a basis offset.
85. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., DEP'TOF THE TREASURY, INsTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1099-
MISC (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099msc_05.pdf. This conclusion is
reinforced by the fact that there are specific reporting requirements for purchases of goods by
"direct sellers" (i.e., not through a permanent retail establishment). See I.R.C. § 6041A. For
purchases offish, see I.R.C. § 6050R.
86. Form 1099-B, see infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text, may contain a CUSIP
number with respect to each block of stock sold. However, the CUSIP number only identifies
the original issue, and it does not serve to identify particular shares. See INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 1099-B (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/fl099msc-04.pdf.
87. A "broker" is one who arranges sales on behalf of another. See Treas. Reg. §
1.6045(c)(1) (as amended in 1997). This definition excludes dealers, traders, and others who sell
on their own account.
88. Id. § 1.6045(a). There is no de minimis exception, except for real estate brokers in
connection with sales of principal residences for $250,000 or less (or $500,000 or less in the
case of married taxpayers) when the gain is wholly exempt under I.R.C. § 121. I.R.C. §
6045(e)(5).
89. This rule leaves out nonbrokered sales and brokered sales of assets other than real
estate, securities, and exchange-traded items. One area not covered by any reporting
requirement, therefore, is inventories. Thus, businesses lacking independent accounting
oversight can understate inventory profits by such techniques as (a) omitting cash sale proceeds
from the computation of gross receipts, (b) overstating inventory costs, and (c) simply not
reporting inventory sales. In addition, businesses would be tempted to ignore nonbrokered sales
of business-use assets, especially assets that have been fully depreciated. Nonbrokered sales of
closely held interests in business and investment entities would also skirt IRS scrutiny due to the
absence of third-party reporting requirements. Finally, in the domain of the sale of appreciated
artwork and collectibles by individuals and dealers, either directly or through auction houses,
there is no third-party reporting except for cash sales in the amount of$ 10,000 or more within
the United States. The latter rule stems from I.R.C. § 60501, under which a business taxpayer is
required to report the receipt of cash in the amount of $10,000 or more in any one transaction.
This provision, however, does not apply to transactions outside of the United States. See I.R.C.
§ 60501(c)(2). Importantly, "cash" under this provision excludes personal checks and credit card
transactions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.60501-1 (c)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1991). Hence, this provision
is unimportant apart from money-laundering schemes.
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sales, and sales not reported to the IRS cannot put the IRS on notice of basis issues.
Moreover, for those section 6045 sales that are reported on Forms 1099-B (sales of
securities) and 1099-S (sales of real estate), the third-party reporting obligation is
expressly limited to the seller's net proceeds of sale.90 These forms do not identify the
buyer (which, in sales over an exchange, would be virtually impossible) and are not
sent to the buyer. Finally, the seller's basis (which might be available) is not reportable
on these forms. 91 In short, there is no effective basis reporting for two of the most
important categories of purchase and sale transactions, marketable securities and real
estate, even though the IRS is supposed to be notified that these transactions have
occurred.
Gratuitous transfers of property also pose basis-reporting problems. The gift tax
return (Form 709) does provide a space for entering the donor's adjusted basis in gifted
property.92 Despite this requirement, such basis has no relevance for the computation
of the gift tax itself, and therefore failure to provide an accurate basis figure would not
expose the donor to any gift tax penalty.93 Moreover, donors need only deliver the gift
tax return to the IRS,94 and there would appear to be no way for the IRS to effectively
use these information returns to track basis in the absence of a system of precisely
identifying property.95 Also, there is no concomitant requirement to notify the donee of
the gifted asset's adjusted basis. Indeed, such a requirement would violate the existing
privacy regulations relating to tax returns.96 To further complicate matters, the donee's
90. In the case of closed regulated futures contracts, only profit (net of basis) has to be
reported. Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1 (c)(5)(i) (as amended in 1997).
91. Securities brokers, independently of IRS reporting requirements, will probably give
their clients confirmation slips as to security purchases, but these will not be identified as "tax
documents" and will not be submitted to the IRS. Brokers sometimes, as a service to clients,
send year-end statements to clients matching basis with amount realized, but such documents are
not submitted to the IRS.
92. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FoRM 709 (2004), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f709.pdf.
93. Although the donor is supposed to show the CUSIP number of any gifted securities on
the gift tax return, the CUSIP number will not be of any use in determining whether the basis
figure entered on the return by the donor is correct. See supra note 86.
94. Under circumstances in which the gift qualified for annual exclusion or the marital
deduction, see I.R.C. §§ 2503(b), 2523, no gift tax return would have to be filed in the first
place. I.R.C. § 6019(a)(1).
95. There is no specific identification system for property listed on Schedule D or other
relevant forms and schedules. Various IRS forms, including Schedule D, call for a description of
the property, but there is no prescribed form or content for the description, and the space in
which it is to be entered is quite small. In the case of real estate, for example, it is not even
necessary to list the address of the gifted property. See IRS SCHEDULE D, supra note 22.
96. See I.R.C. § 6103(e). Only taxpayers have a right to review copies of their own tax
returns. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000). The regulations implicitly acknowledge this resource
limitation, pointing out that "[i]f the facts necessary to determine the basis of property in the
hands of the donor... are unknown to the donee, the district director shall, if possible, obtain
such facts from such donor. . . or any other person cognizant thereof." Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-
l(a)(3) (as amended in 1971).
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basis is not necessarily the same as the donor's adjusted basis 97 unless the donee is the
donor's spouse.98
Recipients of gratuitous transfers from decedents (bequests, inheritances, and IRD
rights) will often have a difficult time trying to determine the basis of the assets
received, even when acting in good faith. The vast majority of estates are exempt from
having to file a federal (or state) estate tax return,99 and in those cases there is no
systemic determination of date-of-death asset values by estate transferees, fiduciaries,
other third parties, or the government.l1° Thus, unless there is a sale shortly after death,
there is no particular reason for anybody to make date-of-death valuations,' 0' which
(except for IRD rights) fix asset basis. 0 2 The lack of date-of-death valuations coupled
with a possibly long time lag between acquisition and sale operate as an open invitation
to inflate the basis of nonpublicly traded assets, especially real estate, artworks,
collectibles, and closely held business interests, for which there are no objective
indicators of date-of-death value.'
0 3
For those large estates that are required to file an estate tax return (Form 706), the
personal representative must specify date-of-death values and, if relevant, the alternate
valuation date values.' 4 However, the Code does not mandate (or allow) the
distribution of this information to estate recipients. 105 Rather, the heir or legatee must
file a request with the IRS to inspect the returns of estates, trusts, and decedents.1
0 6
Finally, there is no rule that the value of an estate asset entered on the estate tax return
is per se binding for income tax purposes. Rather, the estate tax return value is only
97. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
98. I.R.C. § 1041 (b)(2). Similar issues arise in other carryover-basis and substituted-basis
situations, such as like-kind exchanges. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 39.
100. An exception would occur if, for state death tax purposes, there were appraisals
prepared. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-3(a) (1957).
101. In the case of publicly traded assets, date-of-death values can be ascertained after the
fact by consulting market data for the date of death. However, even here the data may produce
an erroneous basis determination if the asset has suffered capital changes.
102. Seesupra note 36.
103. For IRD rights, the decedent's basis carries over, see I.R.C. § 1014(c), but the estate tax
return (even if one is due) imposes no obligation to memorialize the decedent's basis in the IRD
right. In any event, the tax rules for IRD rights (unlike the basis-equals-estate-tax-value rule) is
known only to the tax cognoscenti, and ignorance of the IRD tax rules probably results in
erroneous estate-tax-value basis claims.
104. I.R.C. § 6018.
105. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 706
(Rev. Aug. 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i706.pdf (estate tax return, with
accompanying schedules, submitted only to IRS); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FoRM 1041 AND SCHEDULES A, B, D, G, I, J, AND K-l, 41-44
(2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i 1041 .pdf. The instructions for Schedule K-
1 of estate or trust income tax returns to be sent to beneficiaries make no mention of basis
information.
106. See I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1)(E)-(F), (e)(3) ("material interest" standard); Rev. Rul. 54-379,




presumptively correct; and the decedent's transferee, if not barred by estoppel or
similar equitable doctrine,'17 can overcome that presumption.1
08
The bottom line is that when an in-kind estate transferee sells the property years
after the decedent's death, the recipient may have a difficult time determining the
property's tax basis, and, for that matter, the IRS may have difficulty identifying the
accuracy of such a determination.1' 9 Moreover, since estate tax valuations are not
absolutely controlling for income tax purposes, even estate transferees with access to
estate tax return information have the opportunity to overstate basis in nonpublicly
traded assets without much downside risk.
In sum, from the third-party reporting perspective, it is evident that there is
essentially a void where basis is concerned, and there are serious gaps in the reporting
of sales and other taxable dispositions.
b. Tax Professionals Lack Incentives to Steer Taxpayers Toward Compliance
Many people assume that tax professionals will steer clients toward compliance.
While there may be some truth to this assumption regarding issues of law, there is little
reason to think that it will extend to issues of fact, such as basis determinations.
A large proportion of taxpayers turn over the task of filling out their income tax
returns to professional tax return preparers," 10 and the latter will be familiar with the
most commonly applied basis rules and be motivated to ask taxpayers to supply basis
information for those sales and exchanges that are reported by the taxpayer to the
preparer. However, the preparer can use only the information that the taxpayer
communicates.' Put differently, a tax return preparer is under no duty to use due
diligence to scour records in search of unreported taxable dispositions or to verify the
107. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 276 F.2d 17, 21 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (estate beneficiary not
estopped by estate tax return filed by executor).
108. See Estate of Cordeiro v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 195 (1968), acq., 1969-2 C.B. xxiv; Rev.
Rul. 54-97, 1954-1 C.B. 113.
109. The estate (and perhaps trust) representative filing fiduciary income tax returns will
often be the same person filing the estate tax return. Hence, the estate or trust as an income tax
entity should typically have access to basis information gleaned from the estate tax return with
respect to sales and exchanges by the estate or trust. If there is no estate administration, if the
asset passes outside of estate administration, or if the estate distributes the asset to the heir or
legatee in kind (and there is no I.R.C. § 643(e) election to deem such distribution to be a
realization event), there will be no ready access to basis information except by a request to the
IRS under I.R.C. § 6103.
110. Approximately 56% of all individual taxpayers utilized the services of a paid preparer in
2002. INTERNAL REvENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREAsURY, 24 STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN
2, 253 tbl.1, 351 tbl.23 (Fall 2004).
111. The economic incentive for the preparer to do a thorough job depends on whether the
preparer is being paid an hourly fee or a flat rate. Since an hourly fee arrangement is somewhat
the equivalent of the taxpayer issuing a blank check to the preparer, most individual taxpayers
would be expected to opt for a flat fee arrangement; but a flat fee arrangement will create a
disincentive on the part of the preparer both to take the time to dig out property transactions not
reported by the taxpayer to the preparer and to pursue difficult factual issues such as those
pertaining to basis.
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facts asserted by the taxpayer that underlie the taxpayer's reported positions." 2 At
most, a preparer who is a certified public accountant (CPA) has a duty to ask the
taxpayer if the taxpayer is able to support the basis figures entered on Schedule D."3
Accurate reporting of basis is as unlikely to occur when a taxpayer engages a lawyer
as when a taxpayer engages an accountant or other professional tax return preparer.
The taxpayer will probably be as unforthcoming with a lawyer (regarding tax basis
issues) as with an accountant or preparer. For income tax penalty purposes, a lawyer
giving advice on the contents of a tax return may well be considered a "tax return
preparer,"'" 4 in which case the discussion in the prior paragraph would apply. In
112. The main tax return preparer penalty provision is I.R.C. § 6694(a). It applies in
circumstances when the following threefold conjunctive test is met: (1) a taxpayer's tax liability
stems from a nonmeritorious position, (2) that was known to the tax return preparer, and (3) was
not disclosed or was frivolous. The term position seems to refer to a legal position, such as the
scope of a Code provision or the import of a court case. A position is sufficiently meritorious if
it has at least a one-in-three possibility of being upheld on the merits (i.e., disregarding the
chances of being audited). See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(3) (as amended in 1992) (all nine
examples referring to legal issues). The amount of this penalty is $250. I.R.C. § 6694(a).
A larger tax return preparer penalty (i.e., $1000) applies when the preparer willfully attempts
to understate a taxpayer's tax liability or exhibits reckless or intentional disregard of rules or
regulations. I.R.C. § 6694(b). The "reckless or willful" conduct penalty is described in terms of
applying law to taxpayer-supplied data. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(c) (1991).
Rev. Proc. 80-40, 1980-2 C.B. 774, explicitly states that a tax return preparer has no duty to
verify facts but does have a duty to inquire into facts if the taxpayer-supplied information is
incomplete or appears on its face to be incorrect. In Brockhouse v. United States, 749 F.2d 1248
(7th Cir. 1984), for example, the Seventh Circuit upheld the imposition of a tax-return preparer
penalty on the basis of the accountant's failure to inquire about the import of a known fact,
relying upon the then-version of I.R.C. § 6694 that encompassed "negligent disregard of rules
and regulations." Curiously, the facts of Brockhouse are quite similar to those of Rev. Rul. 80-
265, 1980-2 C.B. 378, in which the IRS held that I.R.C. § 6694 was not applicable! In Rev. Rul.
80-266, 1980-2 C.B. 378, the IRS distinguished between the situation in which an accountant
asked if the taxpayer could substantiate entertainment expense deductions and the taxpayer
(falsely) said that he could do so (no penalty imposed) and one in which the accountant failed to
ask the taxpayer if such substantiation existed (penalty imposed). However, this ruling can be
distinguished from the Brockhouse decision on the ground that substantiation is a legal
prerequisite for claiming entertainment expense deductions. See I.R.C. § 274(d).
113. See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON STANDARDS FOR TAX
SERVICES No. 1.02(a) (rev. ed. 2000) ("A [CPA] should not recommend that a tax return position
be taken with respect to any item unless the [CPA] has a good faith belief that the position has a
realistic possibility of being sustained administratively or judicially on its merits if
challenged.").
114. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b) (as amended in 2002) (an individual is a tax return
preparer if he or she prepares all or a substantial portion of a tax return). Some tax practitioners
are even themselves not entirely forthcoming with the preparation of their own tax returns. See
John Herzfeld, IRS Looking at Practitioners Who Fail to File Own Returns, Official Says, BNA
TAX MANAGEMENT LiBRARY, Nov., 10, 2005 at G3, available at http://library.bnatax.com
/TMD/maillink3.xx3/is/aOblz3w2v8 (subscription required).
The IRS Office of Professional Responsibility is making it an enforcement priority
to gain compliance from tax practitioners who fail to file their own returns, the
office's deputy director says. "You would be surprised how many practitioners
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addition, a lawyer is subject to certain profession-specific ethical duties, but the thrust
of these duties primarily revolves around advising the client on aggressive legal (not
factual) positions." 5
Finally, the tax adviser practicing before the IRS (whether that person is a tax return
preparer, accountant, or lawyer) must comply with the IRS Rules of Practice (known as
Circular 230) or risk losing such right. The relevant portion of Circular 230 states:
A practitioner advising a client to take a position on a tax return, or preparing or
signing a tax return as a preparer, generally may rely in good faith without
verification upon information furnished by the client. The practitioner may not,
however, ignore the implications of information furnished to, or actually known
by, the practitioner, and must make reasonable inquiries if the information as
furnished appears to be incorrect, inconsistent with an important fact or another
factual assumption, or incomplete." 
6
Given this standard, a nonconfrontational tax adviser has no desire or interest in
knowing about incorrect facts on a tax return and has no duty to inquire about facts
unless they appear wrong. A basis entry on Schedule D will practically never appear to
be wrong unless the tax adviser has personal knowledge of the property's market
history-a very unlikely scenario." 7
In sum, tax advisors of all types have every incentive neither to inquire into the
possible existence of undisclosed transactions implicating basis issues nor to question
or investigate the basis figures supplied by taxpayers with respect to disclosed
view filing a tax return as an optional act," Stephen Whitlock says, adding that in
one sample, 11 percent of certified public accountants and 8.5 percent of tax
attorneys had not filed. "I don't know where this is going to go, but we're going to
get some pressure to do more in this area[.]"
Id.
115. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985)
(discussing the strength of authority required for a lawyer to advise a particular position on a tax
return). Of similar import are the rules of practice before the IRS, compiled as Circular 230, 31
C.F.R. § 10.34(a) (2005). A lawyer has no duty to inquire into facts, and a communication by
the client to the lawyer to the effect, say, that the taxpayer's basis figures are wrong may be
protected by the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6(a) (2004). However, the lawyer hearing a client's confession of a material misstatement
of fact (such as a basis figure) is supposed to lecture the client on possible civil and criminal
penalty exposure. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, supra. If the client
persists, the lawyer has the unappetizing choice of withdrawing from representation, MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1), (b)(2)-(3), or risking not only ethical sanctions (and
possible exposure to tax return preparer sanctions), but also exposure to civil and criminal
penalties for aiding and abetting. I.R.C. §§ 6701(a), 7206(2). In any event, the attorney would
have a strong reason to avoid knowing about misstatements of fact on a tax return, and that
translates into not wanting to know the facts in the first place.
116. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(c) (2005). The relevant portions of Circular 230
pertaining to compliance (as opposed to opinion letters) were not altered by the highly
publicized amendments published in 69 Fed. Reg. 75,841-45 (Dec. 20, 2004).
117. Obvious exceptions to this general rule would be where the taxpayer clearly has not
reduced basis to account for depreciation, depletion, and/or loss deductions.
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transactions. These incentives are not modified or overcome by any overriding general
duty to the tax system." 8
c. The Audit Lottery
A basis controversy will arise with the IRS only if the taxpayer is audited. A basis
figure entered on Schedule D can neither be incorrect on its face nor (as noted above)
can it fail to match an information return submitted to the IRS. Similarly, an unreported
taxable disposition for which a Form 1099 is not filed will not attract IRS attention.
Neither situation can generate a computer assessment, and even an error in subtracting
basis from amount realized would not suggest an error in the basis figure itself
The possibility of examination and audit is a function of both IRS resources and
factors relating to the type of item involved. That audit resources are anemic is well-
known in the culture of tax practice and proven by the fact that only about 0.6 percent
of individual income tax returns have, in the recent past, been audited" 9 and a high
percentage of these audits are directed at the earned income tax credit claimed by low-
income taxpayers.12
0
For a time, certain returns were randomly selected for the Taxpayer Compliance
Measure Program (TCMP), which entailed looking at all aspects of a return, including
basis issues, for the principal purpose of generating statistics on taxpayer
compliance.' 2' However, the TCMP was abandoned in 1995, mainly because it was
relatively costly and highly intrusive for the small number of impacted taxpayers. 22
After a period of not collecting random-sampling compliance data at all, 123 a new
information-gathering program, known as the National Research Program (NRP), was
inaugurated in 2002 that is designed to be less intrusive but far less comprehensive
than the TCMP. Unfortunately, the design of the NRP is such that it would be
118. See Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to the System,
47 U. KAN. L. REV. 847 (1999).
119. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, DATA BOOK 2002,
PUBLICATION 55B tbl. 10 (2002) (indicating that for calendar year 2001, only 0.57% of income
tax returns filed were audited). In prior tax years, the audit rate has been only marginally better,
hovering around 1%. See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILrTY OFFICE, IRS AUDIT RATES,
GAO-01-484, at 1 (Apr. 25, 2001) (expressing concern that declining audit rates "could lead to
a decline in taxpayers accurately reporting their tax liabilities").
120. David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Audits of Working Poor Increase, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,2002,
at C2.
121. See MARVIN GARBIS & STEPHEN STRUNTZ, TAX PROCEDURE AND FRAUD: CASES AND
MATERIALS 122 (1982) (referring to comprehensive audits as occurring under the TCMP).
122. See Donald C. Alexander & Edwin P. Geils, IRS Procedures: Examinations and
Appeals, 465 TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS (BNA) A-28 (2003). For a review of current IRS
enforcement strategies, see NINA OLSON, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2004), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/ntafy2004annualreport.pdf.
123. There has been no IRS study on estimates of tax compliance for various categories of
income, deduction, and credit items since the April 1996 publication of INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 1415, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR 1985, 1988, AND 1992 (1996), which is based primarily on
data obtained under the TCMP.
2006]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
extremely unlikely to uncover basis overstatements. 124 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the problem of basis overstatements is virtually invisible on the IRS radar
screen. 
125
Currently, returns (not identified by information-return matching programs) are
mainly selected for audit as a result of "suspect" items on a return that are found
through computer programs identifying deviations from normal ranges of return
entries.1 26 The computer merely identifies returns for which there is a probability of
error, and not all of these returns are actually selected for audit. Once a return is
selected for audit, the examiner will typically focus on only one or a few items on the
return that appear to have the greatest potential for generating a meaningful amount of
additional revenue. 
127
The IRS does not reveal the contents of the computer programs relating to targeted
audits. Writing in 1985, one commentator offered a list of about four dozen
scenarios that would have aroused suspicion. 29 Basis, in general, was not on this list,
and the only items that implicated basis were the following: (1) "unusual items,"'13 (2)
gains on rental property accompanied by a failure to adjust basis for depreciation, and
(3) losses on rental property recently converted from personal use.131
124. The new system of collecting compliance information from random audits, the National
Research Program (NRP), calls for random audits of about 50,000 individual returns a year, of
which 17,000 will involve minimum (or no) taxpayer contact, 30,000 will focus only on selected
items, and 2,000 will look at every item but without requiring substantiation of every item. See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, IRS MANUAL 4.22 (2004), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irn [hereinafter IRS MANUAL]; IRA L. SHAFIROFF, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE DESKBOOK 3-6 to -8 (3d ed. (updated through Aug. 2004)).
For an overview of NRP, see Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Research
Program: Measuring Taxpayer Compliance Comprehensively, 51 U. KAN. L. REv. 1255 (2003);
George Guttman, IRS National Research Program on Track Despite Training Delays, 97 TAx
NoTEs 331 (2002). For a critique of NRP, see Gordon C. Milboum, TIGTA Examines IRS
National Research Program, 2004 TAx NOTES TODAY 28-20 (2004), available at
http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2004reports/200430043fr.html.
125. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES (Comm. Print 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf, reprinted in 2005 TAX NOTEs TODAY 18-39 (Jan. 27,
2005) (presenting a long list of tax reform proposals that would improve compliance; the only
proposal relating to basis is one that would require estate tax values reported on an estate tax
return to be binding for income tax purposes).
126. See IRS MANUAL, supra note 124, at 4.1.3 (referring to target audits as occurring under
the DIF (discriminant function system)). An audit might also be triggered by outside
information, such as media publicity, informers, and public records. See INTERNAL REVENUE
SERv., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 1: YOUR RIGHTS AS A TAXPAYER 2 (Aug. 2000).
127. See Alexander & Geils, supra note 122, at A-27.
128. See IRS MANUAL, supra note 124, at 4.1.3.1.
129. MICHAEL MULRONEY, FEDERAL TAX EXAMINATIONS MANUAL 199-202 (1985).
130. This category might conceivably include the claiming of large (in absolute or relative
terms) losses or reporting a high basis for stock well known to be highly appreciated (e.g., Dell
Corporation stock in the 1990s).
131. The list Professor Mulroney offers, see supra note 129, appears to be based on the IRS
MANUAL CLASSIFICATION HANDBOOK § 41 (12)(0) (1985) as it existed when Professor Mulroney
published his treatise on federal tax examinations in 1985. There appears to be no such list in
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The current IRS manual refers to LUQs (large, unusual, or questionable items) as
items to be examined on returns that the computer has already selected for potential
audit. LUQs, however, are defined in terms of a general (and vague) "factor" test rather
than in terms of specific types or categories of tax return entries;1 no specific mention
is made of basis and gains.
A final point to keep in mind is that the focal point of IRS examinations is
predominately so-called return items (i.e., those items that appear on the face of the tax
return itself). Basis, however, is not a return item in itself but only a "sub-item"
reflected on a schedule that factors into the computation of gain or loss.
Current IRS research into compliance issues is consequently set up in a way that
gain omissions (not reported by brokers) and basis overstatements will not emerge as a
significant compliance issue for IRS management, 133 and the examination and audit
process itself is structured in a way that is unlikely to uncover basis overstatement
cases in the field.
4. IRS Disincentives to Pursue Basis Inquiries
Even if basis overstatements were a compliance issue visible on the IRS radar
screen, and even if the IRS generally possessed the resources necessary to conduct
thorough audits, there exist various procedural and substantive reasons explaining why
the IRS would give basis queries a low priority.
a. Procedural Reasons
Some of the procedural reasons relate to points made earlier. For example, the IRS
would have little reason to contest a taxpayer- or third-party-provided basis figure at
the time of acquisition because the significance of such a figure is contingent on future
events, 1 34 and the IRS has no current system by which it can match such a figure
against a future-amount-realized figure. As to current taxable dispositions, there is first
the issue of whether the disposition is reported at all, and then, even in cases where a
basis-overstatement issue is identified, the IRS might find the task of extracting the
relevant records to be excessively costly, time-consuming, and frustrating, especially
given the fact that there is no sanctionable duty on taxpayers to keep such records in
the first place. And, under those circumstances in which the taxpayer has made a good-
faith guess at basis, the IRS may actually lose if the guessing process produced a basis
figure lower than that which was permissible.
The consciousness level of both the IRS and of taxpayers regarding basis
compliance would certainly be raised if the lack of clear and convincing basis evidence
were to result in a basis of zero. However, there is no statutory rule (equivalent to the
rule of Code section 274(d) totally disallowing unsubstantiated travel and
entertainment expenses) that deems an asset's basis to be zero when there is not
adequate substantiation.
the existing IRS MANUAL.
132. See IRS MANuAL, supra note 124, at 4.10.2.3.1.
133. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 51-81 and accompanying text (discussing basis adjustments and
changes).
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Nevertheless, some commentators may believe that such a deemed-zero basis rule
exists in the common law of the income tax. This misconception probably originates in
an often-quoted passage from the well-known case of Raytheon Production Corp. v.
Commissioner.'35 Raytheon involved the income tax treatment of the receipt of civil
antitrust damages for injury to goodwill. The First Circuit opinion notes that the record
was devoid of evidence as to the amount of the taxpayer's basis in the goodwill and,
that being the case, quoted the Tax Court in determining that "in the absence of
evidence of the basis of the business and good will of [the taxpayer], the amount of any
nontaxable capital recovery cannot be ascertained."'
136
It is easy to read the foregoing sentence as standing for a rule of law to the effect
that if the taxpayer fails to prove basis, the basis shall be deemed zero. At least one
leading income tax treatise describes this aspect of Raytheon in such terms.'
37
However, this reading of the quoted passage in Raytheon is incorrect for two reasons.
First, the taxpayer in Raytheon had a zero basis as a matter of law because outlays
relating to self-created goodwill are deducted as expenses (or possibly are charged to
the basis of identifiable assets other than goodwill). 38 Second, the taxpayer in
Raytheon adduced absolutely no evidence of basis. No relevant and credible evidence
is qualitatively different from some relevant and credible evidence.
During an audit, since the basis-equals-zero rule apparently does not apply, what
rule does apply? The answer is that some version of the Cohan rule applies.' 39 This so-
called "rule" (which lacks uniformity or clarity) basically holds that a court will
estimate the amount of a deduction (in this case, an asset's basis) if the taxpayer
provides some credible evidence to that effect but cannot prove the exact amount.
40
Or, stated somewhat differently, the Cohan rule is a device that allows a court to fix the
amount of a deduction (or an asset's basis) in cases where the taxpayer has sufficiently
established her (perhaps somewhat low) burden of proof regarding an entitlement to
some deduction (or some basis offset).141
The Cohan rule would not come into play if the taxpayer had adequate documentary
evidence of net purchase price and relevant basis adjustments, such as would be
provided by purchase receipts and invoices, broker-supplied notices of the same,
depreciation schedules, and the like. Since most of the reported cases in which basis
135. 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944).
136. Id. at 114 (quoting Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 952, 961 (1943)).
137. DANIEL Q. PosiN & DONALD B. TOBIN, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 139
(6th ed. 2003).
138. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 206 (4th ed. 2002).
139. See Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930) (business expenses); Estate of
Goldstein v. Comm'r, 33 T.C. 1032 (1960) (basis was estimated FMV of property received in
corporate liquidation); McCallson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1316 (1993) (applying Cohan
rule to determine depreciation deduction relating to prior capital expenditure, the amount of
which was in doubt).
140. See generally, Jay A. Soled, Exploring and (Re)Deflning the Boundaries of the Cohan
Rule, 79 TEMP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (on file with author).
141. See Ellis Banking Corp. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 1376 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (court is at liberty
to estimate deductible portion of taxpayer's expense under Cohan rule as long as there is some
evidence that a portion of accountant's fees was deductible).
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was a "fact" issue involved applications of the Cohan rule, the obvious implication is
that this kind of documentary evidence was lacking in whole or in part, meaning that
the court-made determinations were based on such low-grade evidence as oral
recollection testimony by the taxpayer and third parties, acquisition-date estimates for
marketable securities, diary entries, and bookkeeping entries.
1 42
The willingness of the courts to give taxpayers the benefit of the doubt depends on
the facts and circumstances. If the relevant events are recent, the basis history is
simple, and the taxpayer could have easily kept adequate records, the courts might hew
a tougher line, 143 as might also be the case with taxpayers who are uncooperative or
hostile.44 Conversely, if (as is often the case with basis fact questions) the relevant
event lies in the more distant past, the asset has a complex history, and/or there are
credible reasons for not having the records, the greater the chances of a court applying
the Cohan rule in a way that benefits the taxpayer. 145 In any event, the bottom line is
that only in a handful of cases have courts upheld a zero basis determination by the IRS
solely on lack-of-proof grounds.
46
Although the Cohan rule applies in a litigation setting, the same culture exists in the
context of IRS audits and appeals. 147 The IRS manual states that, with respect to any
142. See, e.g., Caldwell & Co. v. Comm'r, 234 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1956), revg, 24 T.C. 597,
622-23 (holding that the Tax Court should have accepted the taxpayer's claimed basis in gifted
stock largely based upon the statement of petitioner's counsel indicating that "the stock was
acquired sometime during the 1920s and the testimony of one of petitioner's officers [that]
would indicate that the stock was worth at least $10 per share throughout").
143. See, e.g., Karara v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 197 (1999), aff'd without opinion, 214
F.3d 1358 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (zero basis result for pro se taxpayer selling stock of one company
and not filing return, not offering any documentary evidence, and proffering only vague
testimony as to cost); Allnutt v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-239 (2004) (IRS position on basis
upheld because taxpayer could not produce any written records that contradicted the IRS's
findings).
144. See Karara, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 197; Allnutt, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-239; Golub v.
Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 367 (1999) (zero basis where taxpayer filed return not showing
basis and claiming, under "far-out" theory, that sales proceeds were not taxable).
145. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Comm'r, T.C.M. 1999-62 ("Although the record does not
indicate with mathematical specificity the amount of [the donor's] basis that passed to petitioner
as a result of the gifts, we are satisfied from the facts at hand that her basis equaled or exceeded
the amount that she realized on the sale."); S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 585 F.2d 466 (Ct. Cl.
1978) (capitalizable carrying charges incurred prior to 1920).
146. See, e.g., Karara, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 197, aff'd without opinion, 214 F.3d 1358 (1 th
Cir. 2000) (taxpayer had not filed a return and offered no proof of basis, which was held to be
zero); Golub, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 367 (same result where taxpayer filed a tax return not showing
basis and claiming sales proceeds were not taxable).
147. A Wall Street Journal investment columnist gave this advice to a taxpayer who lost his
records for a particular security:
Technically, if you can't show proof of the purchase price, the IRS can make you
pay capital gains tax on the entire sale. But the tax cops often will accept a
reasonable estimate. For instance, if you're fairly certain you bought the stock in
1982 or 1983, an average of the high and low price for that two-year period would
probably do.
WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2003, at D1.
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fact issue that does not require documentary evidence as a matter of law, taxpayers are
allowed to offer all kinds of evidence, including oral recollections.
4
The paucity of reported cases dealing with the factual aspect of basis issues is
another indicator that basis issues are (1) seldom subject to an in-depth audit, and (2)
in case of an audit, routinely compromised. 49 An electronic search of decided court
cases that involved tax basis controversies during the ten-year period from 1993 to
2002 turned up only fourteen items relating to basis determinations, and virtually all of
these involved questions of law150 or routine applications of law to facts relating to the
basis of business assets (it being taxpayer lore that Schedule C is a frequent audit
target).' 5' In the most well-known of these cases, Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
United States,5 2 the government did not even attempt to rebut the taxpayer's asserted
cost basis claim for the intangible asset at issue.
b. Substantive Reasons
The IRS has little incentive to pursue basis fact controversies, even those that it
could win, because the benefits may be small relative to effort and expense. Why?
Consider the case of a large (and possibly suspicious-looking) net capital loss
amount for the year. The maximum deductible amount for the current year is only
$3000 on account of the capital loss limitation rules,'5 3 and a $3000 deduction results
148. IRS MANUAL, supra note 124, at 4.10.3.2.5.
149. The Taxpayer Advocate is charged by Congress to outline the most litigated areas of the
Code. In the 2003 findings, tax basis controversies did not even appear on the list of tax
litigation categories. NINA OLSON, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 312-423 (2003),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/nta_2003_annual report2.pdf.
150. Estate of Bean v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 553 (8th Cir. 2001) (shareholder's secondary
liability for a loan to an S corporation does not increase shareholder's basis); Jackson v.
Comm'r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1294 (2001) (same); Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. United States, 32 Fed.
Cl. 80 (1994) (for purposes of claiming casualty losses, assets acquired before 1913 have cost
basis, rather than greater of cost or 1913 value basis).
151. Merino v. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1999) (no basis because sham transaction
entailed no cost); Hunter Sav. Ass'n v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1240 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(composite asset purchase); Lychuk v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 374 (2001) (capital expenditures are
added to basis); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 293 (2000) (same); Gladden v.
Comm'r, 112 T.C. 209 (1999) (cost of land not allocable in part to water rights); McFadden v.
Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 6 (2002) (repossessed property has basis equal to FMV, which is
not necessarily equal to the secured debt); Gallagher v. Comm'r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1149 (2001)
(basis in IRA was zero because all contributions were deductible).
152. 507 U.S. 546 (1993). See also In re Steffen, 294 B.R. 388,397 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003)
("[T]he Government... never questioned the $23,366,705 cost basis figure from the beginning
of their investigation of the Taxpayers, as far back as 1993 .... ).
153. Noncorporate taxpayers can utilize up to $3000 of capital losses against ordinary
income; in contrast, corporate taxpayers cannot deduct any excess capital losses. See I.R.C. §
1211. Excess capital losses are carried forward indefinitely to future taxable years, except in the
case of corporations, which can carry them back up to three years and carry them forward up to
five years. I.R.C. § 1212.
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in only a modest tax saving. 154 Net capital losses in excess of $3000 must be carried
forward and would, accordingly, bear fruit for the IRS only in reduced deductions for
future years. In cases where net capital gain may be understated (or omitted), the
government stands to gain-on a taxpayer-by-taxpayer basis-modest tax dollars
(currently 15%) for each dollar of basis overstatement. 155
Arguably, however, the IRS could find the basis area to be a vast reservoir of
revenue, particularly if viewed from the vantage points of a longer time horizon and
rampant taxpayer noncompliance. These issues will be addressed in Section B below.
5. Propensity to Cheat
In terms of accurate basis reporting, the preceding section attempted to show that
taxpayers obtain little motivation from the system by way of carrot or stick toward
compliant behavior with respect to basis issues or (except for brokered sales of
securities and real estate) taxable dispositions in general. In other words, there are vast
opportunities to underreport gains and overreport basis. Since the lines among
negligent, reckless, and willful noncompliance are hard to draw in practice and
irrelevant from the revenue angle, we shall herein treat all varieties of noncompliance
as "cheating.' 56 This Part describes behavioral influences that contribute to taxpayer
cheating in general and with respect to basis and gain issues.
Although successful cheating clearly advances the taxpayer's self-interest, cheating
can be held somewhat in check by (1) the deterrent effect of legal sanctions and (2)
countervailing norms, whether internalized by taxpayers (moral fiber) or exerted
externally through social pressures. 57 The question we next address is whether these
factors are likely to effectively induce taxpayer compliance in the area of basis and
gain reporting.158
154. The tax savings at the maximum marginal rate of 35% would be $1050 (i.e., 0.35 x
$3000).
155. At the risk of oversimplifying, capital losses taken against capital gains in arriving at net
capital gain for the year produce a tax benefit equal to the maximum marginal rate applicable to
net capital gains (currently 15% for most net capital gain categories). Thus, the stakes are
somewhat less if the overstated basis inheres in a capital gain asset or a capital loss asset. In
contrast, an ordinary loss (or a net capital loss not exceeding $3000) saves taxes equal to such
loss times the maximum marginal rate of the taxpayer (currently up to 35%). I.R.C. § 1(i)(2).
156. See I.R.C. §§ 7201-7207 (all tax crimes require specific intent); Walter T. Henderson,
Jr., Criminal Liability Under the Internal Revenue Code: A Proposal to Make the " Voluntary"
Compliance System a Little Less "Voluntary," 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1429, 1436 (1992)
(advocating a "mild expansion of the existing criminal sanctions to reach reckless
noncompliance"). See generally Michael W. Spicer, Civilization at a Discount: The Problem of
Tax Evasion, 39 NAT'L Tax J. 13 (1986) (examining the nature and extent of tax evasion).
157. See generally Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in
Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 1453 (2003) (arguing that increased deterrence mechanisms
do not undermine compliance norms).
158. See Curtis J. Berger, "Voluntary" Self-Assessment? The Unwilling Extraction of
Taxpayer Information, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 759, 760 (1981) ("One thing is perfectly clear.
Congress-whose members understand human nature better than do most of us-recognized
long ago that integrity alone would not insure truthful reporting.").
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a. Sanctions Are Unlikely to Be Effective
Under the "rational-choice model" of adaptive human behavior, people weigh the
relative advantages and disadvantages of any action. Without sanctions, virtually no
one would pay taxes because the monetary advantages of not paying outweigh the
advantages of paying. From the perspective of self-interested taxpayers, paying taxes
has the disadvantage of benefiting people other than the taxpayer, and the benefits of
taxes are only indirectly advantageous to taxpayers.
59
Obviously, though, government (and its undeniable benefits) would not exist unless
somebody pays taxes. In other words, a collective action problem is "solved" by the
imposition of a universal tax-paying duty. 16 However, this duty is compromised in the
federal income tax area because of the self-assessment paradigm, the lack of universal
withholding at the source, the lack of universal third-party reporting, and the likelihood
of shirkers and evaders going undetected. Therefore, the opportunity to cheat is vast in
areas such as basis and gain reporting, where there is no requirement of withholding' 6'
and where third-party reporting is of limited scope.
162
159. See Eric Rakowski, Transferring Wealth Liberally, 51 TAx L. REv. 419, 437 (1996)
(given that taxes flow into a pot, it is hard to link specific tax dollars to specific benefits). This
point echoes criticism of the "benefit principle" of tax fairness. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL,
PRINCnLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 804-05 (W. J. Ashley ed., Longmans, Green, and Co. 1929)
(1848).
160. This is the problem faced by Enlightenment theorists of government. See, e.g., John
Locke, Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay, in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 58 (Robert Hutchins ed. 1952) (positing duty of citizens to support government that
would secure life, liberty, political rights, and property).
161. Of course, withholding from the gross proceeds of sales transactions would be very
crude because the withholding agent would have no knowledge of the amount of gain (or loss),
which depends on basis information that the withholding agent would typically not know about.
However, withholding would be practical when securities and commodities brokers have clients'
basis information. Moreover, withholding from the gross proceeds of sales transactions would
be an effective way of "smoking out" the unknown basis information. See I.R.C. § 1445
(withholding of 10% of the sales proceeds required with respect to dispositions of U.S. real
property interests by foreign taxpayers unless the taxpayer and IRS agree on correct amount of
tax). See also infra Part II.B.
162. Those who think that any taxes they pay do not "purchase" personal benefits of equal
value will have an economic motive to cheat. A person holding an antigovernment ideology may
think that noncompliance by herself and like-minded persons would advance their political
agenda. Even those lacking an antigovernment agenda would be subject to certain cognitive
biases that would operate to produce a perception that taxes do not yield equal economic value.
See ScoTr PLous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 185-86 (1993)
(stating that one such influence is the "self-serving bias," whereby people attribute market
success to themselves and obstacles and failures to others and the environment). It is therefore
not surprising that survey data generally show that people in the United States do not like (and
are opposed to) taxes. Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Anne Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax
Policy: A Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 75, 77-79 (2003).
The general antitax attitude derived from calculations of economic self-interest is
compounded by the "free-rider" problem, whereby the potential tax cheater would anticipate
being able to obtain the benefits of government without paying for them. The free-rider problem
is actually exacerbated in a general climate of tax compliance because a potential cheater
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At this point in the rational-choice model, deterrence strategies (legal sanctions) to
control undesirable behavior are necessary 63 because taxpayers will cheat unless the
gains from cheating are outweighed by the expected loss attributable to penalties.'
64
Merely being "found out" and then required to pay the correct tax owed (with interest)
is not a meaningful sanction since the taxpayer is then no worse off than if compliance
had occurred in the first place.' 65 The effectiveness of penalties depends on the
combination of their severity, contingency (in occurrence and amount), and futurity.'6
Unfortunately, as presently designed and instituted, the tax penalties for basis and gain
noncompliance are not up to the task of providing effective deterrence.
On one end of the sanction continuum, there are criminal sanctions for tax fraud that
can result in taxpayer imprisonment and fines of a degree that, if credible, would cause
a rational actor to hesitate before cheating. 67 However, criminal tax fraud is
notoriously hard to prove because of the "specific intent" requirement.
68
After criminal tax fraud, the next most severe penalty is for civil tax fraud, but here
the penalty is drastically less severe than for criminal fraud. 69 Indeed, the penalty
currently would amount to only about eleven cents for every dollar of basis
understands that federal expenditures will not be reduced if only one taxpayer cheats (or if only
a limited number of taxpayers cheat).
163. See Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and
Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 367, 369 (2002).
164. See Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical
Analysis, 1 J. PuB. ECON. 323, 324-26 (1972). See also generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (discussing the optimal
amount of resources and punishments to enforce laws).
165. The taxpayer may (or may not) expend additional time and effort dealing with the IRS,
but the taxpayer may actually enjoy the contest.
166. It is a well-known heuristic to discount future occurrences at an excessively high rate.
Also, remote contingencies are likely to be undervalued. Pulling in the other direction is the
general tendency to risk aversion, so that a small chance of being subjected to a severe penalty
(especially a criminal penalty with media publicity) might have a substantial deterrent effect.
167. See I.R.C. § 7201 (willful attempts to evade tax, carrying a maximum penalty of five
years imprisonment and/or a $100,000 fine); I.R.C. § 7203 (willful failure to, inter alia, keep
any records or supply any information required by law, carrying a maximum penalty of one year
imprisonment and/or a $25,000 fine).
168. See MARVIN J. GARBIs, RONALD B. RUBIN & PATRICIA T. MORGAN, TAx PROCEDURE AND
TAX FRAuD: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 9 (3d ed. 1992). This requirement mandates that the
government prove without a reasonable doubt that there was (1) a legal duty imposed on the
defendant, (2) actual knowledge by the defendant of such duty, and (3) an intentional violation
of such duty. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991). The authorities are rife with
statements to the effect that criminal tax fraud is not meant to trap the lazy, the negligent, and
the uncomprehending because (1) the tax laws are extremely complex and (2) lesser civil
penalties exist for nonfraud offenses. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973); United
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933). In the area of basis overstatements, where the
record-keeping duties are vague and the rules often complex, one would expect to find few (if
any) examples of successful criminal tax fraud prosecutions. Indeed, we conducted an electronic
search of all federal tax cases and did not turn up a single reported example of an attempted (or
successful) criminal tax fraud prosecution relating to basis overreporting. It is therefore safe to
say that the threat of criminal prosecution is not credible with respect to basis.




overstatement that reduces capital gains. 70 Reported cases imposing civil fraud
penalties on gain understatements attributable to inflated basis reporting are virtually
nonexistent.1 7 1 Cases involving nonreporting of taxable sales exist but are still
uncommon, and fraud penalties are typically not imposed for such omissions unless the
omissions appear to be calculated and systematic.
72
On a still lower level of severity are the civil "accuracy-related" penalties listed in
Code section 6662(b), for which the penalty is 20 percent of the underpayment
attributable to any violation of the statutory standards. 173 Thus, the penalty is only three
cents for every dollar of understated capital gain or overstated capital loss! 174 In the
area of our primary focus (investment gains and losses), this penalty is so feeble as to
be laughable, and it renders a discussion of the legal standards essentially academic.
The accuracy-related penalty that is most relevant to our discussion is the one for
"negligence or disregard of rules and regulations." 175 This penalty (especially the
aspect of disregard of rules and regulations) encompasses both legal and factual
errors. 76 The negligence aspect encompasses "any failure to make a reasonable
170. See id. Multiplying the (usual) maximum capital gains rate of 15% times 75% yields
11.15%.
171. Civil tax fraud also requires the same specific intent as for criminal tax fraud. See, e.g.,
Bradford v. Comm'r, 796 F.2d 303, 307 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the burden of proof remains
with the IRS, the standard of proof is reduced to that of "clear and convincing evidence." In
Groves v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 1201 (1999), the taxpayer-a tax attomey who once
worked for the IRS-overstated basis of stock that had a somewhat complex history. The
taxpayer pleaded guilty to two criminal counts related to the taxpayer's failure to supply tax
basis information in the audit and examination process, but the Tax Court held that the
overstatement of basis itself was negligence, not fraud.
172. See Marcella v. Comm'r, 222 F.2d 878, 885 (8th Cir. 1955) (holding that treating
outlays on property as "improvements" rather than "repairs," although erroneous, did not
amount to fraud); LiButti v. Comm'r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 241, 263--64 (1985) (holding that a
failure to keep records with respect to some investments does not amount to civil fraud;
however, a subsequent pattern of failing to keep records for substantial dealings in tangible
personal property is evidence of civil fraud); Nat'l Land Co. v. Comm'r, 10 B.T.A. 527 (1928),
acq. in result 1928-1 C.B. 22 (holding that the omission of land sale is not fraud in the context
of a carelessly prepared return). Cf Thurston v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 350, 356 (1957), acq. in
result, 1957-2 C.B. 7 (gross negligence in record keeping not fraud). But cf Scott v. Comm'r,
15 T.C.M. (CCH) 1156 (1956) (holding that a systematic and consistent lack of adequate
business records amounted to civil fraud). Most of the cases noted in the extensive annotations
under I.R.C. § 6663, found at 16 CCH FED. TAX REP. 39,658, involve business taxpayers
omitting income and claiming excessive deductions. Practically none involve taxpayers only in
their capacity as investors.
173. I.R.C. § 6662(a). The term underpayment refers to the tax that would have been paid if
the return had been correct minus the tax that was in fact paid on account of the sanctionable
violation of one of the standards set forth in I.R.C. § 6662(b). Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5(g) (as
amended in 1992).
174. The product of the 15% net capital gains rate and the 20% penalty rate results in a
figure of 3%.
175. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1).
176. There are two relevant accuracy-related penalties that only rely upon objective criteria.
The first applies in instances when taxpayers have "substantially understated" their taxes (in
general, more than 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return). I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(2), (d).
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attempt to comply with the provisions of this title."'177 In the case of (in)accurate
reporting of basis and gains, the phrase provisions of this title would refer not only to
the substantive basis rules, some of which are complex, but also to the imprecise and
permissive record-keeping standards described earlier. 78 The notion of "failure to
make a reasonable attempt to comply" with such standards raises a question of fact, the
resolution of which would be highly contextual, and judges and juries would be
expected to be somewhat sympathetic to taxpayers having less than impeccable records
and being forced to cope with underpublicized and complex basis rules. There is no
way of telling how often negligence penalties for basis overreporting and gain
nonreporting are successfully imposed at the administrative level; but it is known that
audit activity is low in our areas of concern, 179 and court decisions imposing the
However, given the fact that capital gains for noncorporate taxpayers are subject to a tax rate of
only 15% (currently), the substantial-understatement penalty would rarely come into play for
many high-income taxpayers reporting inaccurate basis or gains. Consider an example involving
an unmarried taxpayer who had taxable income of $400,000 and a tax liability of $121,332 in
2004, but who omitted net capital gains in the amount of $88,000. If the capital gains had been
included, the correct tax amount would have been $134,532; however, the $13,200
understatement of tax would be less than 10% of the correct amount, so the penalty would not
apply despite the huge understatement.
The second relevant accuracy-related penalty relying on objective criteria applies where
taxpayers claim an adjusted basis on a particular property item that is 200% or more of the
correct adjusted basis amount. I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(3), (e)(1)(A). (Note that if the correct basis is
zero, the 40% penalty would automatically apply. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5(g).) If the basis
overstatement is 400%, the penalty rate is doubled to 40%. See I.R.C. § 6662(h). That, however,
still is not severe in the case of understated net capital gains.
Neither of the objective accuracy-related penalties apply, however, unless the resulting
understatement of tax exceeds $5000, I.R.C. §§ 6662(d)(1)(A)(ii), (e)(2), which translates to a
net capital gains understatement of more than $33,333. In addition, there are defenses
potentially applicable to some or all of the accuracy-related penalties, although none of them
appear to be particularly helpful to taxpayers in this context. For example, the penalty for a
"substantial understatement of tax" is waived (except in the case of tax shelters) if there is (a)
substantial (legal) authority for the taxpayer's position or (b) adequate disclosure on the return
(coupled with a reasonable basis for the position). See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B).
Virtually all of the cases that impose the basis overstatement penalty have involved tax
shelters purporting to generate substantial current depreciation deductions but having a zero
basis on account of "sham debt." See, e.g., STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 39,654.55 (2005)
(listing example cases); Gilman v. Comm'r, 933 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1031 (1992); Rybak v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 524 (1988). In Visserv. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH)
1734 (1993), the taxpayer was subject to a negligence penalty for failing to produce basis
records relating to a purchase of commercial real estate, but he avoided the basis overstatement
penalty because the claimed deductions were disallowed on the alternative ground of not having
placed the structures in service. The only case noted by CCH not dealing with tax shelters in
which the basis overstatement penalty was imposed is Wyatt v. Comm 'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1540
(1991), involving the overallocation of property costs to depreciable avocado trees.
Thus, in their present form, neither of the "objective" accuracy-related penalties seem to be a
significant "player" in the game of combating abuses of the type discussed herein.
177. I.R.C. § 6662(c).
178. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 119-33 and accompanying text.
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negligence penalty for errors involving investor basis and gain are few and far
between.'80
The civil penalties that can be brought to bear in our area of concern are, on
balance, economically very light and appear to be rarely imposed on investors. The
criminal fraud penalty appears to exist on paper only. At this point in our analysis, it
would be reasonable to hypothesize rampant cheating on basis issues and extensive
nonreporting of gains transactions not subject to third-party reporting.181
b. Compliance Norms Are Too Weak to Constrain Cheating
The rational-choice model can be said to be incomplete insofar as it relies
exclusively on deterrence and neglects to factor in the effect of social norms, which
might be defined as shared attitudes and understandings relating to social conduct not
directly explainable in terms of pecuniary self-interest calculations.' 82 Some
180. But see Bothwell v. Comm'r, 77 F.2d 35, 38 (10th Cir. 1935) (imposing negligence
penalty where executive failed to report exercise of stock option but claimed basis equal to value
of stock at date of exercise); Groves v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. 1201 (1999); Bilzerian v. Comm'r,
82 T.C.M. (CCH) 295 (2001) (holding taxpayer negligent for not noting preparer's omission of
$4 million gain transaction); Drummond v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1959 (1997), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom, 155 F.3d 558 (4th Cir. 1998) (subjecting taxpayer to negligence
penalty for failure to review a return done by a preparer that omitted gain from the sale of
artwork); Miller v. Comm'r, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 210 (1951) (holding that error in reporting gain
on sale of orchard was not due to negligence). Golub v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 367 (1999)
(taxpayer, after (inter alia) failing to offer any proof as to tax basis, had to pay accuracy-related
penalties on account of negligence, that is, not acting as a prudent person in good faith); cf
Meyers v. Comm'r, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1535 (1968) (imposing negligence penalty for overstating
cost of goods sold). The extensive annotations in 16 CCH FEDERAL TAX REPORTER 1 39,651G
with respect to the negligence (etc.) penalty identify no cases on investor basis and gain other
than those noted. However, there are dozens of cases imposing the negligence penalty for failure
to keep adequate records in general. See id. at 39,651 G.63. Undoubtedly some of these involve
basis and gain issues, but it appears that these are overshadowed by the commonly-raised issues
of gross income omissions and deduction overstatements. See, e.g., Hulbert v. Comm'r, 32
T.C.M. (CCH) 1024 (1973) (holding basis of ranch overstated by unsubstantiated
"improvements"; this and numerous other errors due to inadequate record keeping resulted in
imposition of negligence penalty).
181. Cf John S. Carroll, How Taxpayers Think About Their Taxes: Frames and Values, in
WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXEs 43, 50 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 1992) (stating that 57% of middle- and
upper-income taxpayers in the study reported understating income and overstating deductions).
182. See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585,587 (1998)
(defining social norm as a "consensus in a community concerning what people ought to do...
[that] affects what people actually do"). Thus, an isolated attitude or opinion is not a norm.
However, the notion of a consensus is not very limiting because conflicting social norms may be
held by a given individual, and an idiosyncratic attitude may be shared within a subgroup (such
as a gang, congregation, or single-issue political aggregation). See Lederman, supra note 157, at
1507-08 n.281 (reporiing studies of tax noncompliance norms among certain subgroups).
We take no position with respect to such theoretical issues as whether the impact of social
norms can be incorporated within the rational-choice model. See Brian Erard & Jonathan S.
Feinstein, The Role of Moral Sentiments and Audit Perceptions in Tax Compliance, 49 Pun.
FIN. PUBLIQUES 70 (1994); James P.F. Gordon, Individual Morality and Reputation Costs as
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commentators argue that such norms have a greater effect on compliance with the law
than deterrence through penalties.'
8 3
The operation of norms has been advanced as an explanation of why tax compliance
in the United States is higher than in most other countries. I8 Honesty, law-abidingness,
and cooperativeness are compliance-favorable norms that may well spill over into the
tax area.185 There may even be some who adhere to a specific norm of complying with
tax duties, believing that taxes are the price one pays for civilization or for being a
citizen of the state.1
8 6
On the other hand, there may exist countervailing norms of an antigovernment,
antitax, and/or tax-evasion character, which can be collectively referred to as
libertarian norms. One kind of manifestation of libertarian norms is overtly political
Deterrents to Tax Evasion, 33 EuR. ECON. REv. 797, 797-804 (1989) (both positing that
compliance with norms plugs into the taxpayer's utility function). We also take no position with
respect to the mechanisms by which social norms might influence behavior. See, e.g., Eric
Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REv. 1781, 1787-91
(2000) (advocating "signaling" theory of norms); Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard
Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. Cm. L. REv. 607, 608-09 (2000).
183. See Kent W. Smith, Integrating Key Perspectives on Compliance: A Sequential
Decision Model, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 350, 359 (1990).
Such norms may be internalized, in which case they would constrain or override the
economic calculus; or they may be externalized, in which case the norms become integrated into
the calculus. For example, an internalized norm of law-abidingness would override a temptation
to break the law (as in running a red light), whereas the same norm if viewed as part of the
endogenous landscape (social disapproval) would simply be another factor to consider in the
economic calculus. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1127
(2000) (explaining a view that internalized norms are those that elicit guilt feelings).
184. That social norms influence tax compliance is supported by studies that show different
compliance rates for citizens of different countries independent of the country's enforcement
apparatus. See Kahan, supra note 163; James Aim, Isabel Sanchez & Ana De Juan, Economic
andNoneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3, 14 (1995). Norms are often said to
be embedded in, or produced by, culture. However, culture and norms are separate analytical
constructs. Norms are attitudes and patterns relating to social interaction, whereas culture may
be said to refer to the content of the symbols and artifacts that identify a people vis-A-vis other
peoples. TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 75-77 (1937). In any event, the
relationship and degree of separation (if any) between culture and norms is not important for our
purposes, except to note that norms are generally more malleable than culture. See Lederman,
supra note 157, at 1509-10 (noting that compliance attitudes might drastically "tip" with
moderate increases or decreases in enforcement).
185. See Wilbur C. Scott & Harold S. Grasmick, Deterrence andIncome Tax Cheating, 17 J.
APPLIED BEHAv. Sci. 395 (1981) (explaining that tax cheating carried a stigma in the United
States during the time period studied).
186. This view is expressed by Justice Holmes in Compania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas v. Collector ofInternal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (dissenting opinion). Even
more explicit is Holmes's statement, "I pay my tax bills more readily than any others-for
whether the money is well or ill spent I get civilized society for it." Letter to Harold J. Laski
(May 12, 1930), in HOLMES-LASKI LETrERS 2:1247 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). However,
a parallel example of the expression of civic duty and participation, and one that entails minimal
cost (if minimal benefits), is voting. The fact that voting turnout even in presidential elections is
quite low is indirect evidence that a specific norm of tax compliance is not widely held.
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and can take such forms as (1) ideological commitment to libertarian principles,' 87 (2)
opposition to the U.S. government in all or most of its manifestations, and/or (3)
adherence to the tax protestor movement. 18 Another type of libertarian manifestation is
the widespread attitude among the economic elite that the government is the adversary
in a taxpayer's economic life. 8 9 A related notion is that the system is too complex and
burdensome for an honest person to follow. 190 Another widely held belief is that most
taxpayers in a position to cheat do cheat (and most get away with it),191 so that only
fools strictly comply with tax obligations. 92 If the IRS is so lax in enforcement that tax
cheaters are willing to go public to boast about "getting away with it,"'193 why should
ordinary citizens take their compliance duties seriously? 194 In any event, a system in
which there is significant noncompliance not only is unfair to those who do comply,
but also does not deserve respect. 95 Several of these attitudes and perceptions (or, if
you will, rationalizations) can operate in a way such that even normally law-abiding
citizens may feel justification in negligent or intentional noncompliance.196
187. Ideological libertarianism does not necessarily imply defiance of the law or tax evasion,
but it implies a disrespect for much government activity financed by taxes and could thereby
imply a jaundiced or minimalist view of tax compliance responsibilities.
188. Certain aspects of the tax protestor movement are discussed in DAVID CAY JOHNSTON,
PERFECTLY LEGAL ch. 14 (2003).
189. This attitude may have roots in the phenomenon of individual psychology known as the
self-serving bias, which attributes personal success to the actor and personal failure to outside
influences. See PLous, supra note 162, at 185-86 (reporting studies finding such a self-serving
bias and other studies attributing positive behaviors to the person and negative behaviors to the
environment). Cf LLAM MURPHY & THoMAs NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OwNERsI-P: TAXES AND
JUSTICE 34-37 (2002) (stating the book's project as being the overthrow of the pervasive
"everyday libertarian" norm that pretax market outcomes are just); Joshua D. Rosenberg, The
Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA.
TAX REv. 155, 171 (1996) (stating that taxpayers undervalue the benefits received from
government).
190. See Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An
Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 259, 281 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 1992)
(asserting that hearing about unfair treatment of taxpayers by the IRS increases future
noncompliance).
191. This belief is not unfounded. See supra note 181.
192. See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REv. 333, 340-44
(2001) (linking law compliance to social reciprocity); Richard C. Stark, A PrincipledApproach
to Collection and Accuracy-Related Penalties, 91 TAX NOTES 115, 123 (2001) (explaining
desire to avoid being a chump relative to the free riders); YANKELOViCH, SKELLY & WHITE, INC.,
TAXPAYER ATrTITUDES STUDY: FINAL REPORT 61 (1984) (demonstrating tax compliance affected
by perceptions of others' behavior).
193. See JOHNSTON, supra note 188, at 196-98.
194. See Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance,
in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 190, at 223,244-45 (stating that compliance is linked
with perceptions of the state's interest in enforcement). Cf Jon S. Davis, Gary Hecht & Jon D.
Perkins, Social Behaviors, Enforcement, and Tax Compliance Dynamics, 78 AccT. REV. 39,40
(2003) (suggesting that publicizing the "tax gap" hurts compliance).
195. See Smith, supra note 194, at 223 (stating that compliance is linked with perceptions of
fairness).
196. On close inspection, this chain of reasoning seems rather circular: the inability or
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Clearly, norms in the tax area pull both in the direction of compliance and against it,
suggesting that norms do not operate very strongly, overall, to cause taxpayers to
comply with tax duties when it is not in their perceived self-interest to do so.197 Several
kinds of evidence support this conclusion. First, studies of the taxpayer population
show that cheating is not only extensive' 9" but is also increasingly seen as acceptable
behavior by the public.199 Second, it is known that voluntary compliance drastically
drops off in the absence of third-party reporting. 2°° Third, it appears that compliance
norms weaken in a climate of low enforcement.
20
'
Norms are evidently somewhat malleable, and there is good reason to think that a
prevailing pro-tax-compliance norm could well "flip" to a prevailing noncompliance
norm in an environment of antigovernment rhetoric and critically minimized
enforcement. 20 2 Since the mid-1990s, Congress has bashed the IRS, starved it for
unwillingness of others to comply results in a perception of tax system unfairness, which itself
becomes a reason for noncompliance by the observer. At a minimum, this kind of thinking is an
easy rationalization for noncompliance or sloppy compliance.
197. See OLSON, supra note 122, at 219-21 (recognizing issue of compliance norms and
noting the existence of noncompliance norm communities).
198. See supra note 181.
199. See George Guttman, Rossotti's Thoughts on the IRS and the Tax System, 96 TAx
NOTES 1822 (2002) (former IRS Commissioner Rossotti noting "a huge gap between the number
of taxpayers whom the IRS knows are not filing, not reporting, or not paying what they owe, and
the IRS's powers of enforcement"); Martha Middleton, The Tax Gap: Why Don't People Pay
Up?, 69 A.B.A. J. 572, 572 (1983) ("More auditing by IRS agents has been suggested... but
the plain truth is that there aren't enough agents and resources to do the job."); Sandra Block,
The Trouble with Taxes, USA TODAY, April 9, 2004, at I B ("The number of Americans who
believe cheating is acceptable has risen sharply, to 17% last year from 11% in 1999, according
to an IRS survey."); David Cay Johnston, US. Discloses That Use of Tax Evasion Plans Is
Extensive, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at C4 ("In several hundred pages of affidavits, tax returns
and other documents filed in Federal District Court in Tampa, the Justice Department provided
the most extensive picture yet of how much the government knows about the growing business
of tax evasion and how little it has done, or even can do, to stop it."); David Cay Johnston, A
Smaller I.R.S. Gives Up on Billions in Back Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2001, at Al ("The
Internal Revenue Service, its staff reduced by a sixth since 1992 and its mission shifted to
customer service, has virtually stopped pursuing more than one million tax delinquents and has
sharply curtailed other kinds of enforcement."); Janet Novack, Are You a Chump?, FORBES 122,
124 (March 5,2001) ("Americans are becoming ever more shameless about how they dodge the
IRS, and ever more confident that the IRS can't keep up with them."); Amy Hamilton, GAO
Says IRS Compliance Resources Declined over Past Three Years, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 68-5
(April 9, 2003), http://www.taxanalysts.com (subscription only) ("The IRS actually experienced
an over 7% decline in compliance staff between 2000 and 2002.").
200. One study showed a 99.5% compliance rate for wages and salaries and a 41.5%
compliance rate for self-employment income. See JOEL B. SLEMROD & JON M. BAKLA, TAXING
OURSELVES 150 (3d ed. 2004); James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax
Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITRATURE 818, 824 (1998). Accord Lederman, supra note 157, at
1503-04; Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Comparative Study
and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 107, 116 (1990) ("[S]elf-employed
individuals in the United States have a tradition of noncompliance, and studies have consistently
shown them to be among the worst tax offenders.").
201. See Lederman, supra note 157, at 1513.
202. See id. at 1509-11.
2006]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
funds, and redirected its mission towards "service" (rather than enforcement), resulting
in an individual audit rate below one percent.20 3 Thus, compliance norms are likely to
be in acute danger of being swamped by a combination of self-interest and
anticompliance norms.2 °4
In the final tally, taxpayers have the motive, the opportunity, and the means to
wantonly inflate basis and omit sales (not reported by third parties), and sanctions and
norms do not present a significant obstacle to the accomplishment thereof In terms of
circumstantial evidence, the picture that emerges is that of a "smoking gun" of basis
misreporting.
B. Revenue Cost to the Government
Despite the circumstantial evidence that large-scale basis overreporting and gain
omissions are commonplace, direct evidence of the revenue loss is hard to pinpoint.
This is because the whole aim of noncompliance is to avoid detection. Quantification
is, nevertheless, a worthwhile endeavor because it aids in delineating the amount of
governmental attention a particular area warrants. Tax compliance data and economic
data both aid in determining the scope of noncompliance.
In the tax-compliance data realm, one study estimates the tax gap attributable to
underreporting of total taxable income to be $180 billion ($150 billion by individual
taxpayers and $30 billion by corporate taxpayers) for 2001.2°S Schedule C (profit and
loss from business) filings contributed to about sixty percent of that $180 billion tax
gap, and the earned income credit contributed to another five percent. 206 That leaves a
gap of about $63 billion for everything else. Because compliance with respect to
income reported by third parties (wages, interest, dividends, and royalties) is fairly
high, a good portion of this gap is therefore probably due to errors in Schedule D
(capital gains and losses) and Schedule E (income from rents, royalties, estates, and
trusts).2 °7 Unfortunately, reliance upon the 2001 tax gap estimate proves frustrating
because it does not attempt any breakdown by income category.
203. The story is told by JOHNSTON, supra note 188, chs. 10-11. See Leandra Lederman, Tax
Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REv. 971,972-74 (2003) (noting a belief in
some quarters that a "kindler, gentler" IRS will actually result in increased compliance rates).
204. The IRS appears to have come to a similar conclusion and is planning to step up
enforcement. See INTERNAL REVENuE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, STRATEGIC PLAN 2005-
2009, PUBLICATION 3744, 18-24 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/strategicplan 05-09.pdf.
205. See OLSON, supra note 149, at 20 n.3 (citing OFFICE OF RESEARCH, INTERNAL REvENuE
SERv., TAx GAP MAP FOR TAX YEAR 2001 (2001)).
206. See id. at 21-22.
207. Errors in Schedule A (itemized deductions) would seem to be relatively unimportant
because of I.R.C. § 67 (imposing a 2% of adjusted gross income "floor" on "miscellaneous
itemized deductions") and I.R.C. § 68 (phasing out itemized deductions for high-bracket
taxpayers), as well as I.R.C. § 56(b)(1) (disallowing many itemized deductions, the standard
deduction, and the personal and dependency exemptions for alternative minimum tax purposes).
A possible exception might be valuation overstatements under the charitable deduction (I.R.C. §
170); however, such overstatements are subject to a separate civil accuracy-related penalty under
I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2), (e).
[Vol. 81:539
DEBUNKING THE BASIS MYTH
Another tax compliance study,208 building upon prior research, shows a correlation
between noncompliance and transaction nonvisibility (i.e., situations which involve no
third-party reporting).2°9 The author of this study calculates a 22.6 percent
nonreporting rate for all nonvisible items (including net capital gains). 210 Applying this
22.6 percent noncompliance rate against reported net capital gains (assuming a 15
percent tax rate) would have produced a revenue shortfall of about $11.5 billion in
2003.211
In the 1990s, two studies attempted to identify the noncompliance rate specifically
for net capital gains. A 1994 General Accounting Office (GAO) repor 2&' 2 based its
category-by-category breakdown of the tax gap on 1980s data from the now-defunct
TCMP.213 The GAO report recorded an aggregate net capital gains noncompliance rate
214of about twenty-five percent. Using this rate, the amount of revenue loss associated
with capital gains misreporting would have been $12.9 billion for 2003. However, the
1996 IRS Compliance Report (based on the same data) chronicled a noncompliance
rate of only 7.2 percent for net capital gains. 215 Using this rate, the amount of revenue
loss due to capital gains misreporting would have been only $3.7 billion for 2003.
208. See KIM M. BLOOMQUIST, TRENDS As CHANGES IN VARIANCE: THE CASE OF TAX
NONCOMPLIANCE (IRS Research Office 2003).
209. See JEFFREY A. ROTH, JOHN T. SCHOLZ & ANN D. WITrE, TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE,
VOLUME 1: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH (1989); Susan Long & Judith Swingen, Third Party
Information Reporting and Compliance, in RESEARCH CONFERENCE REPORT: How Do WE
AFFECT TAXPAYER BEHAVIOR? 117 (IRS Doc. 7302) (IRS 3-9 1).
210. See BLOOMQUIST, supra note 208, at 4. The 22.6 % figure was obtained from a 1988
IRS compliance study. See Charles W. Christian, Voluntary Compliance with the Individual
Income Tax: Results from the 1988 TCMP Study, IRS RESEARCH BULL. (IRS Publ'n 1500) 35-
42 (Rev. 9-94).
211. The $11.5 billion figure for 2003 was obtained by aggregating all gains and losses from
the sale of property in 2003 ($338 billion), see IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME 2003 (2-04),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/o3in01 fg.xls, and multiplying it by 22.6 percent and
15 percent.
212. See Tax Gap: Many Actions Taken, but a Cohesive Compliance Strategy Needed,
GAO/GGD 94-123 (May 11, 1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/151585.pdf.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25 (discussing TCMP, otherwise known as the
"comprehensive audit program"). The 1996 Compliance Study is based on data for the years
1985, 1988, and (by extrapolation from 1988 figures) 1992. For 1988, it found that individual
taxpayers had underreported net capital gains income to the tune of $12.2 billion, which
(assuming a tax rate of 15%) would have resulted in a revenue loss of $1.83 billion at that time.
See 1996 COMPLIANCE REPORT, infra note 215, at 48. Of the $12.2 billion, $6.9 billion was
attributed to "overstated basis" and the remaining $5.3 billion to "other," which presumably
means not reporting gain transactions and understating amounts realized.
214. See GAO REPORT, supra note 212, at 48.
215. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE
RESEARCH: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR 1985, 1988, AND 1992 (PUBLICATION
1415) 8 (Rev. 4-96), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/p141596.pdf [hereinafter 1996
COMPLIANCE REPORT]. Insofar as individual income tax returns are concerned, capital gains
underreporting constituted a significant portion of the overall tax gap-in fact, one of the tax
gap's largest sources of unreported income. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH; GROSS TAX GAP ESTIMATES AND PROJECIONS
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Finally, an earlier study (examining a sample of particular files selected for the
TCMP data compilation) that focused exclusively on capital gains noncompliance for
the year 1979 discovered an overall net capital gains noncompliance rate of a
whopping thirty-two percent.216 This rate would have produced a revenue shortfall of
$16.4 billion for 2003.
Despite its age, we consider the 1979 study to be the one that is likely to be the most
accurate with respect to the specific issue of basis and gain noncompliance. 217 Not only
is the study itself more specifically focused on the issue at hand, but there is good
reason to believe that the TCMP audits relied on by the other studies would have failed
to uncover significant amounts of unreported gains (there would have been no trace of
such on the tax returns as filed) and would have failed to pursue basis inquiries to the
ultimate degree.218
Notwithstanding the undoubted significance of these various tax data studies, we
harbor strong doubts as to their accuracy, particularly as they relate to current and
future tax years. Since the discontinuance of the TCMP in the late 1980s and early
1990s, 219 there have been no comprehensive income-category studies of the tax gap
based on tax return data. Estimates of the overall tax gap in recent years have been
based simply upon extrapolations from the data contained in the 1996 Compliance
Report, but such extrapolations are based on two flawed assumptions.
The first assumption is that unreported net capital gains have increased at the same
rate as the increase in the overall tax gap. A more plausible assumption is that
unreported capital gains grew in size at a rate equal to or greater than the increase in
the volume and value of property transactions, which happens to have been tenfold.220
If noncompliance increased only at the same rate as the reported underlying economic
FOR 1973-1992 (PUBLICATION 7285) 3 (1988) (presenting a chart for 1987 indicating that close
to 10% of the tax gap was attributable to the misreporting of capital gains income), reproduced
in 88 TAX NOTES TODAY 61-35 (1988).
216. See Thomas A. Thompson, 1979 Individual Income Tax: Capital Gains Income
Reporting Noncompliance, in IRS TREND ANALYSiS AND RELATED STATISTICS 130 (1987)
(finding a reporting error of $8.84 billion against reported net capital gains of $27.63 billion, a
32% noncompliance rate). This study found that over 50% of the error was attributable to
nonreported gains and that one of the most underreported asset categories was personal
residences. The personal residence gain reporting issue has been largely (if not completely)
swept under the rug by the expansion of I.R.C. § 121 (excluding up to $250,000 of gains per
taxpayer per qualified principal residence sale). Under current law, taxable residence gains
include a portion of large gains from principal residence sales and all gains from the sale of
vacation homes and rental properties. Even if all residence gains were removed from the 1979
figures, the error rate would still have been 28%, which is the figure we use in the text.
217. There have been no congressional and IRS compliance initiatives in this area since
1979 except for the enactment of the substantial-tax-understatement and substantial-basis-
overstatement penalties. See supra note 169.
218. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. See also GOv'T ACCOUNTABMrrY OFFICE,
TAX GAP: MULTPLE STRATEGIES, BETrER COMPLIANCE DATA, AND LONG-TERM GOALS ARE
NEEDED TO IMPROVE TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE, GAO REPORT 06-2087 (2005).
220. See BLOOMQUIST, supra note 208, at 4 tbl. 1 (showing tenfold increase in reported net
capital gains from 1985 to 2000 based on Statistics of Income data); U.S. CENsus BUREAU,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005, at 755 tbl. 1201 (2004) (increase of
831% of stock volume activity from 1990 to 2000, but no increase from 2000 to 2003).
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activity, the 2003 revenue loss would have been in the range of$18.3 to $32.4 billion
using the conservative noncompliance rate figure of 7.2 percent.
The second flawed assumption is that of a constant rate of noncompliance since the
data were collected. Such an assumption is understandable because there is no later
noncompliance data from which to ascertain any possible change in noncompliance
rates. However, it would seem that noncompliance rates with respect to capital gains
and losses in particular are very likely to have increased since 1992 due to lax
enforcement by the IRS in general, a relaxation of tax compliance norms,22' the
lowering of tax rates on capital gains, 222 the absence of any meaningful compliance
initiatives in this area by Congress or the IRS, and increased opportunities to hide
property transactions (and basis information relating thereto).223 The combination of
these factors leads to the conclusion that noncompliance rates for capital gain
misreporting are likely to have increased by at least fifty percent.
In short, when the raw tax data (which is over fifteen years old) is coupled with
consideration of economic and compliance trends-and if extrapolations are adjusted
for the volume of property transactions-the annual revenue loss could easily escalate
as high as $60 billion annually. 224
In addition to examining tax compliance data, economic data could theoretically
also be used to determine the amount of capital gains understatement. This approach is
currently unavailable, however, because any attempt to convert the available data on
aggregate household wealth into realized-gain amounts founders on the problem of
identifying taxpayers' asset realizations. Since realization statistics are all based on tax
221. See supra Part I.A.3.
222. For example, the maximum capital gains rate (apart from special categories, such as
collectibles and depreciable real estate) was 28% from 1987 to 1996, 20% from 1997 through
April 2003, and 15% from May 2003 to the present. Gregg A. Esenwein, CFR Reports on
Capital Gains, 2005 TAx NOTES TODAY 35-22 (2005). This decline in tax rates (relative to the
rates on other income) would likely result in a decrease in enforcement interest by the IRS.
223. For example, the area of like-kind property exchanges, which presents an easy
opportunity to overstate basis, has increased dramatically over the last twenty years. Another
example would be the increased use of offshore brokerage accounts. See Albert B. Crenshaw,
IRS Leniency to Users of Shelters; Illegal Schemers Targeted, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2003, at A9
(describing that while it is not illegal to have an offshore account, such credit card accounts
were often promoted on the basis that the IRS could not find out about them). Offshore bank
accounts are effectively immune from the brokered-sales reporting requirements set forth in
I.R.C. § 6045. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. A third example is stock splits,
common in the stock boom of the 1990s, which cause dilution in per-share basis but which can
be easily "overlooked."
224. Our revenue estimates uniformly assume that the tax rate of 15% is applicable to net
capital gains. However, some portion of the unreported net gains would have been taxed at
ordinary rates on account of being (1) short-term capital gains, (2) ordinary gains due to
recapture, (3) gains that otherwise don't qualify for capital gains treatment, (4) excess capital
losses deducted against ordinary income, (5) 28%-rate net "collectibles gains," and (6) 25%
"nonrecaptured" section 1250 gain. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1221, 1245, 1250. These higher-rate
gains would swamp the lower-rate gains of low-income investors and those of certain small
business stock under I.R.C. § 1202. In addition, capital gains earned by corporate taxpayers do
not receive preferential tax treatment and are generally taxed at a rate equal to either thirty-four
percent or thirty five percent. I.R.C. § 11.
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data,22 5 it follows that the realization statistics cannot be used to accomplish the goal of
gauging the accuracy of that tax data. Nevertheless, there is some economic-data-
derived evidence 226 supporting the hypothesis of substantial revenue loss due to
taxpayers' tendencies either to overstate their basis or to fail entirely to report their
227transactions.
To sum up, the circumstantial evidence discussed in Part A combined with the tax
data discussed above (and perhaps economic data as well) indicates a major annual
revenue loss. Over the next ten-year span (assuming constant dollars), at least a half-
trillion dollars of revenue are at stake. Even for those operating in and around
government who can be relatively numb to figures in the millions, figures in the
hundreds of billions are worthy of attention.
II. PROPOSED REFORM MEASURES
Proposals for improving basis and gain compliance should be nonintrusive, efficient
(in the cost-benefit sense), and technologically feasible. We offer several proposals
designed to meet these benchmarks. However, we acknowledge that even were
225. Studies of realization behavior are typically directed toward the issue of whether
lowering the capital gains rate will produce a net increase in revenues due to increased
realizations. See THE CAPITAL GAINs CONTROVERSY: A TAX ANALYSTS READER 71-180 (J.
Andrew Hoemer ed., 1992) (excerpting nineteen published items on this issue).
226. A 1990 study that attempts to circumvent the data problems (by using a decision-
modeling approach) estimates that the ratio of realized gains to the total market value of
corporate equities is around 0.04 under tax rate assumptions that are close to those in the current
Internal Revenue Code. See Donald W. Kiefer, Lock-In Effect Within a Simple Model of
Corporate Tax Trading, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 75, 80 tbl. 1 (1990). Another source claims that half of
all gains are realized (before gift or death). See Jane G. Gravelle, Commentary on Chapter 11, in
DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAxING THE RICH 389,389-90 (Joel B.
Slemrod ed., 1992). What is needed, and what is (apparently) not available, is independent
(nontax) evidence of realization behavior in particular years. Another problem is that existing
studies focus almost exclusively on marketable equities, the most liquid kind of asset and the
kind that would be most responsive to changes in tax laws. See supra note 222. However, other
asset categories held by individuals with significant gain potential, such as real estate and
noncorporate equities, have a net value at least twice that of corporate equities. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 220, at 458 tbl.695 (giving figures on household and charity assets and
liabilities).
227. If the 0.04 assumed annual realization rate offered by Kiefer, see supra note 226, is
applied only against marketable securities held by individuals (outside of retirement plans), the
expected realizations (from 2000 through 2003) from this one source alone would have been
close to reported net gains from all sources using IRS statistical (SOI) data. Specifically, such
predicted realizations (set against reported realizations in parentheses) are as follows: 2001,
$360 billion ($326 billion); 2002, $272 billion ($292 billion); and 2003, $327 billion ($332
billion). (These figures are adjusted to take into account the fact that tax-exempt U.S. taxpayers
own about 5% of this kind of wealth; foreign taxpayers and pension-plan assets are initially
excluded.) Even allowing for an assumed lower realization rate for real estate and noncorporate
business interests (not to mention artwork and collectibles) and taking into account the I.R.C. §
121 exclusion for primary residence gains of $250,000 per taxpayer, these figures would seem to
suggest that a significant percentage of realized net gains are not being accurately reported.
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Congress to adopt all of our proposals, the problem of inflated basis would not be
entirely eliminated.
Our proposals are of three general types: (1) broadening third-party reporting with
respect to basis and taxable dispositions (and improve the ability of the IRS to use
basis information), (2) imposing a higher standard of proof upon taxpayers with respect
to basis issues while making it easier for taxpayers to produce such information, and
(3) changing certain underlying substantive tax rules to make basis computations easier
to figure and to track.
A. Broadening Third-Party Reporting Requirements
Studies uniformly demonstrate that taxpayer compliance levels are vastly higher in
areas of third-party reporting than in areas where third-party reporting does not exist.
228
However, as noted earlier, third-party reporting in the areas of basis and taxable
dispositions is virtually nonexistent (except for sales proceeds in certain brokered
transactions). 229 Therefore, the most obvious type of reform would entail full utilization
of third-party reporting.
Not all asset transactions are susceptible to third-party reporting, however; to
differentiate those asset transactions that are and those that are not, we categorize
investments as follows: (1) intangible financial assets purchased and sold on an
230 231exchange,230 (2) intangible nonpublicly traded financial assets, (3) tangible assets
sold through third parties, 232 and (4) tangible assets not sold through third parties. 233
Within each of these asset categories, there are varying degrees of third-party reporting
opportunities.
228. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 212, at 5 ("Information returns are a proven way to
promote compliance and help IRS find noncompliance."); Michael C. Durst, Report of the
Second Invitational Conference on Income Tax Compliance, 42 TAX LAw. 705, 707 (1989)
("Computer-based enforcement techniques, relying largely on information returns filed by
payers of wages, interest, dividends, and other items, have provided valuable benefits by
virtually eliminating noncompliance with respect to important categories of income."); Gene
Steuerle, The Heyday of the Comprehensive Individual Audit Is Over, 53 TAX NoTEs 859, 860
(1991) (advocating further expansion of third-party information reporting).
229. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
230. This category of brokered financial assets includes, besides marketable securities,
mutual fund investments and other financial products, commodities futures dealt with on a
commodities exchange, and over-the-counter stocks purchased and sold through brokers.
231. This category constitutes mainly equity interests in closely held businesses such as
partnerships, limited liability companies, and S corporations. Unique intangibles, such as
patents and copyrights, are excluded from our analysis. As taxpayers annually amortize the cost
of these assets, taxpayers can fairly easily trace the basis they have in such assets.
232. This category would include most investment real estate plus artwork and collectibles
sold at auction houses and possibly over the Internet.
233. This category includes real estate, artwork, and collectibles purchased from dealers and
private parties (possibly over the Internet).
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1. Intangible Financial Assets Purchased and Sold on an Exchange
Financial assets purchased and sold on an exchange offer an excellent opportunity
to move to a system of third-party reporting of gains and losses. Under present law, a
broker must submit an information return to the IRS reflecting the amount of a
taxpayer's net sales proceeds (i.e., Form 1099-B),23 4 but this information-reporting
requirement does not include tax basis information. Instead, the submission of accurate
tax basis information rests entirely with the taxpayer. However, in virtually all cases
the assets will have been purchased through the same broker or a predecessor broker.
Brokers already record the purchase price of assets, which they report to their
customers. Brokers are thus often in the best position to match cost information with
amount-realized information. The only new task that brokers would need to perform in
order to accurately figure gain and loss would be to keep track of basis through capital
changes. Reporting of gains and losses is feasible, as proven by the following: (1)
many brokers already perform this service for taxpayers,235 (2) brokers have the
technical wherewithal to perform it,236 and (3) mutual funds (and certain other
investment vehicles) already comply with a system close to that proposed here.237 A
gain and loss reporting system would make things easier for taxpayers, who would not
have to keep track of basis at all in the case of financial assets acquired and housed
with a broker.23 s
At year's end, the broker would report aggregate figures for all relevant tax
categories (i.e., long-term capital gains, short-term capital gains, etc.) on a special
Form 1099-GL (GL being an acronym for Gain/Loss) to the IRS and to taxpayers.
Aggregation by category would save taxpayers the trouble of keeping track of large
234. I.R.C. § 6045.
235. Many firms provide gain and loss information as a complimentary service to their
customers. For a fee, several private companies also offer tax basis identification services over
the Internet. See, e.g., CCH - Capital Changes, http://www.cap.cch.com/ (last visited Sept. 17,
2005).
236. Brokerage firms have computers and access to tax and computer experts to perform the
necessary tasks.
237. Mutual funds (regulated investment companies) and their shareholders are taxed
according to the rules provided in I.R.C. § 852. Basically, the mutual fund can avoid company-
level tax if it distributes all of its net income as dividends. The dividends have the same
character (as ordinary income, net capital gain income, tax-exempt income, or nontaxable return
of capital) to the shareholders because the net income was composed at the company level.
Thus, all of the accounting occurs at the entity level, and the character of the distributions is
reported to the shareholders. Similar quasi-pass-through investment vehicles include (1) REITs
(real estate investment trusts), governed by I.R.C. §§ 856-859, and (2) REMICs (real estate
mortgage investment conduits), governed by §§ 860A-860G. A discussion of these (and other)
quasi-pass-through passive investment vehicles is beyond the scope of this Article, except to
note that these entities are corporations or trusts subject to reporting requirements applicable to
dividends and distributions, as the case may be.
238. Taxpayers often shift investment portfolios from one broker to another. In such a case,
Congress would require that tax basis identification information be transferred from the old
broker to the new broker and that the new broker henceforth would be responsible for tax basis
tracking.
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numbers of transactions and having to submit supplemental Schedule D forms. 2 39 Of
course, the raw data that constitutes the components of the aggregate figures should be
available to the IRS and taxpayers.
An issue for brokers involves basis adjustments that arise from facts unique to the
taxpayer on account of a gratuitous transfer. 240 This problem can be virtually
eliminated if substantive tax rules are altered so that all gifts and estate transfers are
subject to either a "straight" carryover basis rule (as with property transferred from one
spouse to another) or an FMV-basis-at-transfer rule (as is the current rule with respect
to testamentary transfers). If either of these changes were instituted, adjustments would
have to be made only where an FMV-basis-at-transfer rule applies, and in that case the
broker can make the adjustment on being informed of the triggering event and its date.
To the extent that these substantive-law changes are not instituted, there are two
possible ways to deal with brokered financial assets that are subject to personally
unique basis adjustments. One is to treat such assets as having been acquired by the
taxpayer outside ofthe brokered-financial-assets system, which would shift the burden
of fixing basis onto the taxpayer. The other would be to leave the assets in the system
and require the taxpayer to separately report the basis adjustment on an appropriate
line on Schedule D.
Although virtually all marketable financial assets are sold through brokers, some
might not have been initially so acquired. That is, the taxpayer may have possession of
the actual stock certificates for one reason or another (e.g., shares were owned prior to
the company being publicly owned) but needs the services of a broker to effect a sale.
This scenario is similar to that of tangible assets sold through a third party and should
be governed by the same system, in which the selling broker would continue (as under
present law) to report the gross and net proceeds of sale to the taxpayer and the IRS,
with the taxpayer being responsible (under rules proposed below) for accurate basis
reporting.
241
2. Intangible Nonpublicly Traded Financial Assets
In this subsection, the focus is on issues relating to the basis of equity interests in
entities that are not traded on any exchange and that are taxed in whole or in part on a
pass-through basis. 242 More specifically, we are dealing with equity interests in S
239. An issue would be whether the broker could charge the customer for the service. This,
presumably, is a matter for the Securities and Exchange Commission. See generally I.R.C. §
6045(e)(3) (real estate broker cannot separately charge a customer for filing information returns
with the IRS but can take relevant costs into account in setting fees for services).
240. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
241. An alternative approach might be for the broker to ask the taxpayer for basis
information and to have the broker report the gain or loss as proposed in the text preceding this
text paragraph. However, the broker is not in a position to verify (and would not want to accept
the burden of verifying) the basis figure proffered by the taxpayer.
242. Mutual fund shares are usually publicly traded; equity interests in other specialized
passive investment quasi-pass-through entities are sometimes publicly traded. See supra note
237. Basis adjustments in mutual fund shares can be occasioned by many events, including
dividend reinvestments. Basis adjustments in other kinds of interests in passive investment
vehicles can be occasioned by the passing through of income, gain, or loss (apart from any
20061
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corporations and in entities treated as partnerships for tax purposes, which (along with
other entities subject to similar tax rules) are collectively referred to herein as "pass-
through entities" on account of the fact that income, deductions, gains, and losses are
passed through (in whole or in part) to the equity holders. Here, the third party is the
legal entity itself, rather than a broker or "external" third party. The agenda is (1) to
make sure that all taxable dispositions not made through brokers are reported to the
IRS and (2) to facilitate the record keeping of the basis of interests in such entities.
Under present law, the entity is supposed to issue a Form K-I on an annual basis to
each equity holder.243 On this form, the reporting entity conveys many pieces of
significant tax information (such as the investor's gains and losses and, if relevant, his
capital account). Conspicuously absent, however, from the face of Form K-I is the
basis of the taxpayer in his equity interest (referred to as "outside basis"). Yet, every
year, a taxpayer's basis is likely to fluctuate due to gains, losses, and, in the cases of
tax partnerships, liabilities incurred by the entity itself.
24 4
Asking equity holders in pass-through entities to keep track of all the relevant basis
adjustments (as is currently the case) is a lot to ask both from a legal and mechanical
point of view; and from the perspective of the equity holder, who must inevitably hire
the services of a tax professional to conduct this tracking, it is an expensive
proposition. Moreover, the motivation to keep track of outside basis may be low due to
the fact that it would have no year-to-year relevance, except in the case of a tax shelter
or failing business.
245
We propose first that the basis of the equity holder be initially established in the
year of acquisition. In the case of an original issue, the entity would report the initial
equity outside basis to the holder and the IRS. In the case of a (nonbrokered) sale, the
buyer would notify the entity of the purchase price,24 and the entity would report the
gross sale/purchase price to the IRS, the seller, and the buyer. Every year, the entity
would be obligated to issue a Form K-I with adjusted tax basis information.
Obviously, this approach would place some additional administrative burdens on
the reporting entity, but the entity would be ideally situated to handle this responsibility
since it has all the relevant information readily at hand. (Moreover, similar burdens are
already placed on C corporations with respect to liquidations, mergers, and other
capital changes. )247 Since the entity would obtain purchase, basis adjustment, and sales
distribution). See I.R.C. § 857(b)(3)(D) (pass-through of undistributed capital gain of real estate
investment trust with concomitant basis increase); I.R.C. § 860C (pass-through taxation of
residual interests in real estate mortgage investment conduits). These kinds of investments will
not be separately discussed in the text because of their esoteric nature, but the proposals
discussed in the text should be considered to apply to these specialized investments as well.
243. I.R.C. §§ 6031(b), 6037(b).
244. I.R.C. §§ 703, 1367.
245. In years a tax partnership or S corporation experiences losses, loss limitation rules that
are tied to a taxpayer's basis in that enterprise maybe triggered. I.RC §§ 704(d), 1366(d)(1)(A).
246. The entity would need to know about the change in ownership both for internal
accounting purposes and to fulfill its reporting obligations to the IRS.
247. See I.R.C. § 6043. Section 6043 requires an information return stating the amounts paid
to shareholders of C corporations (both in cash and the FMV of securities received) in
liquidations, redemptions, and other capital changes. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6043-4T (as amended
in 2003). Under our recommendations, the effect of such transactions would be factored into
basis by brokers in the case of publicly traded securities. In the case of securities that are not
publicly traded, the C corporation could be required to inform shareholders of any basis
[Vol. 81:539
DEBUNKING THE BASIS MYTH
information for an equity interest held by a particular equity holder, the entity would be
in a position to compute the gain or loss on the equity interest when sold and report the
same to the IRS and the seller,248 thereby relieving the selling equity holder of any
independent duty to track basis.
249
3. Tangible Assets Sold Through Third Parties
Under current law, third-party reporting requirements for tangible assets exist only
2525
with respect to real estate,25 whr the broker251 is only required to report the proceeds
of sale.252 In the case of tangible assets, it would be so rare for the same broker to be
involved in buying, holding, and selling the same asset that this category should be
deemed to be a separate category apart from that of brokered intangible assets. The
selling broker in this category (which would include brokered-sale intangibles acquired
individually by the taxpayer) would be assumed to have no direct access to initial basis
or to facts causing adjustments to basis, such as losses, depreciation, subdivisions, and
improvements. Thus, it is not feasible to impose on brokers the determination and
reporting of gains and losses in this category. Nevertheless, a system can be set up to
use selling brokers as a means to create strong incentives to report gains and losses
more accurately.
Perhaps the best approach would be one modeled on Code sections 897 and 1445,
applicable to sales of United States real estate by foreign taxpayers.253 Based upon this
model, what we envision is that the selling broker (in a taxable sale) would be required
to withhold an amount equal to fifteen percent of the proceeds of sale (i.e., an amount
equal to the "general" capital gains tax that would be imposed if the basis were
zero).254 The withholding tax would be reduced to fifteen percent of any gain (or to
adjustments that derive from capital changes.
248. The entity would also be in a position to identify any ordinary gain under I.R.C. § 751
in the case of a sale of a partnership interest.
249. Equity holder-specific adjustments to basis on account of gratuitous transfers could be
taken into account by informing the entity of the events that give rise to such adjustments. See
supra note 239.
250. See I.R.C. § 6045(e). There is an exception for wholly exempt sales of a seller's
personal residence under I.R.C. § 121.
251. For this purpose (real estate sales), the term broker can mean any of the following (in
descending order of priority): (1) the closing agent, (2) the mortgage lender, (3) the seller's
broker, (4) the buyer's broker, and (5) any other person as prescribed by regulations. I.R.C. §
6045(e)(2).
252. See I.R.C. § 6045(a) (gross proceeds and other information required by regulations);
Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-4(b), (h)-(i) (as amended in 2000) (must report cash and future cash gross
proceeds, whether the receipt of property or services is involved, and the portion of any real
property tax treated as being imposed on the purchaser). Curiously, the value of property
received in an exchange is not reported, although the fact that an exchange has occurred is
subject to reporting. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-4(b) (defining real estate transaction).
253. See also I.R.C. § 3406 (providing backup withholding at a rate of 31% for any
"reportable payment," which in the case of payments other than dividends and interest is limited
to payments to persons with no TIN (taxpayer identification number) or with an incorrect TIN).
254. The capital gains rate for collectibles is actually 28% and that for real estate gains
attributable to depreciation is 25%. See I.R.C. § 1 (h)(1)(C) and (4). The withheld amount under
I.R.C. § 1445 is currently 10% of the sales price. I.R.C. § 1445(a). Perhaps the withholding
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zero in the case of any loss) calculated using the basis figure supplied by the
taxpayer. 2"5 However, the taxpayer-supplied basis information would be accepted by
the broker only if the taxpayer supplied credible documentary evidence of such basis,
for example, the closing statement received upon purchase (and, in the case of
depreciable property, the aggregate amount of depreciation claimed). 2 6
The broker would report the tentative gain and loss, along with the amount (if any)
withheld, to both the taxpayer and the IRS. At this point, the final onus of basis
reporting would be placed on the taxpayer. (We discuss the obligations ofthe taxpayer
with respect to proving basis in Part B.)
Whether or not a withholding tax is imposed on the proceeds of a brokered sale,
brokers can be enlisted on the basis side of the compliance equation. Specifically, in
the case of taxpayer-acquired assets that are obtained in taxable brokered transactions,
brokers would have a one-time reporting obligation to inform the IRS and the taxpayer
of the asset's purchase price. In the case of a brokered asset acquisition that does not
yield a cost basis (such as a like-kind exchange under I.R.C. section 1031), the form
submitted by the broker would not state a purchase price but would instead indicate
that the property had been acquired in a tax-free or partially tax-free transaction.
Broker-supplied basis information, although helpful to taxpayers, would be fairly
useless to the IRS unless the IRS could match this information against subsequent sales
proceeds. The most plausible solution to this problem would be for the IRS to design
an electronic filing system website that would assign an asset (and taxpayer)
identification number to an asset adequately described by the broker.25 7 Upon sale of
the asset, the taxpayer would be required to supply the correct asset ID number. This
electronic filing system will be henceforth referred to as the "Asset Identification
Number System" (AINS).
A final issue relevant here is whether the concept of broker should extend beyond
the existing understanding of that term in tax practice (i.e., brokers of financial
intangibles and real estate) to include other third-party participants, such as auction
requirement could be waived for any sale at an amount below some threshold, say, $20,000. For
example, the Code currently provides a withholding exception for residence sales that do not
exceed $300,000. I.R.C. § 1445(b)(5).
255. A problem would arise as to how withholding would operate for installment sales
reported under I.R.C. § 453, the whole purpose of which is to postpone the tax on the gain. Here
(to prevent avoiding the withholding requirement), the rule should be that the withholding tax
should be the greater of 15% of the gain with respect to the first year's payments or 15% of an
amount equal to 20% of the total gain. Moreover, the installment method itself should be
restricted to assets for which third-party financing is basically unavailable, such as rural acreage
and interests in closely held businesses.
256. Under I.R.C. § 1445(b)(4), the buyer is relieved of withholding if the foreign seller
proves that such seller has agreed with the IRS to pay the appropriate tax. Such supplied-to-
broker basis information would only affect the withholding requirement. It would not be final
for purposes of the taxpayer's own tax return.
257. Consider several models for such an ID system: certain law reviews accept article
submissions over the Interet upon the submission of an electronic application giving relevant
information; the electronic filing system assigns a number that is henceforth used for
identification purposes. Airlines, hotel chains, and rental car companies issue similar
"confirmation numbers." The information would vary according to asset. Thus, in the case of
real estate, the application should show the address, the plat information (if any), and the
acreage, as well as relevant information of the purchasing taxpayer.
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houses dealing with antiques and collectibles, art and collectibles dealers acting on a
consignment basis in the secondary market,258 and Internet trading sites that inter-
mediate transactions involving art and collectibles. It would appear that the existing
statutory definition of broker (for the purpose of reporting sales proceeds) could easily
be extended by regulation to include auction houses and consignment dealers with
respect to art and collectibles in the secondary market. 259 However, any reporting
obligations should be limited to those intermediaries that provide significant services
(as opposed to facilities), and this limitation rules out Internet trading sites, at least
initially.260 To alleviate administrative burdens, this reporting requirement would
encompass only those sales at a price in excess of some threshold number, say,
$10,000.
4. Tangible Assets Not Sold Through Third Parties
What is still on the table is the category of nonbrokered tangible assets. This
category would comprise sales with no third-party involvement; that is, dealer
(nonconsignment) sales and private sales of nonbusiness real estate,261 art, and
collectibles, including sales made over the Internet. 262 If any reporting is to be done in
this type of case, the reporting onus must be on the buyer or the seller.
263
Consistent with our proposal with respect to tangible assets sold through third
parties, the strictest option would be to impose a withholding requirement on the seller.
Another (but slightly weaker) option would be to require the seller to report the gross
proceeds to the IRS and to the buyer. However, it would be against the self-interest of
the seller to do either in the absence of a stiff, no-fault penalty for noncompliance.
Therefore, we conclude that seller reporting should be limited to sellers who are
dealers, on the theory that business taxpayers are accustomed to some scrutiny by the
258. Consignment sales on behalf of creating artists (i.e., sales in the primary market) are
reportable under I.R.C. § 6041(a) (payments of $600 or more as compensation, etc.), because
the artist will have a zero basis in the work under I.R.C. § 263A(h) and the work would not be a
capital asset under I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3). Royalties for authors are required to be reported as
compensation under I.R.C. § 6050N.
259. The statutory definition of the term broker under I.R.C. § 6045(c)(1) "includes-(A) a
dealer... and (C) any other person who (for a consideration) regularly acts as a middleman with
respect to property or services." The general definition of broker in Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(a)
(as amended in 2005) is "any person... that, in the ordinary course of a trade or business...
stands ready to effect sales to be made by others." However, all of the examples refer to
securities, commodities, currency, and real estate brokers, and none refers to art dealers, etc.
260. Nevertheless, Internet trading sites operated by auction houses might be included.
Dealers are often sellers on Internet trading sites, and in that case imposing requirements on the
latter would be redundant.
261. There is no reason to subject I.R.C. § 1231 assets---those assets used in the taxpayer's
trade or business-to additional reporting requirements because they will be reported, reflecting
the taxpayer's depreciation or amortization computation, on the taxpayer's return in the year of
acquisition.
262. There would be no point in imposing reporting requirements for purchases and sales of
personal-use assets that ordinarily depreciate greatly in value, such as yachts and private planes,
because losses on such items are nondeductible. I.R.C. § 262.
263. In order to eliminate unnecessary administrative burdens, any proposal in this area
should probably exempt transactions with a gross proceeds amount below, say, $100,000.
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IRS and can cope with reporting requirements. 26 4 In private sales, the rule should be
that the purchaser has to obtain an asset ID number and report the basis to the IRS or
else suffer a zero basis for the purchased asset.
In the end, a system that appropriately mandates the use of information returns that
report gains and losses, withholds at the source of payment, and reports basis under an
AINS would not be ineffectual or impractical. Armed with information returns and
saddled with withholding, taxpayers could readily complete Schedule D of their Form
1040s and would have a major incentive to do so.
B. Strengthening Taxpayers' Obligations to Identify Basis
The previous section offers proposals that would relieve taxpayers of keeping track
of basis in the vast majority of cases. In this Part, we consider taxpayer obligations
with respect to basis in the remaining cases, which mostly involve tangible assets not
sold through a third party.
As noted earlier, current law encourages, rather than mandates, that taxpayers
maintain basis records.265 Taxpayers hear mixed messages, particularly from the mass
media, to the effect that record keeping is important but that the IRS will accept
taxpayers' best estimates.266 However, the integrity of the tax system should not rest on
mere guesses.
An obvious move to improve taxpayer compliance in a widespread abuse situation
is to impose a sanctionable substantiation requirement on taxpayers. For years,
taxpayers were able to estimate travel and entertainment expenses. 267 Frustrated by
taxpayers who took liberties with their estimates, Congress instituted Code section
274(d), which requires that taxpayers substantiate such expenses before any amount
thereof can be deducted.268 More recently, Congress followed suit in a similar fashion
with respect to charitable deductions in excess of $250: taxpayers must now offer
contemporaneous written paperwork authenticating their charitable contributions.269
A similar approach should be applied in cases where the taxpayer has the
responsibility of establishing basis (or an upwards adjustment to basis of which a third
party would not be aware). In order to eliminate taxpayer estimates, we recommend the
following simple rule: the tax basis of an asset (that is not subject to the system of
third-party responsibility for computing gain and loss) would be deemed to be zero
absent (1) a basis supplied under the AINS in appropriate situations,270 or (2)
documentary substantiation of basis in other cases.
27 1
264. Art dealers representing living artists should already be accustomed to filing
information returns. See supra note 258.
265. See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 147.
267. See, e.g., Kahn v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 1417, 1420 (1938) (allowing taxpayer
entertainment expenses that he could substantiate only by oral testimony).
268. I.R.C. § 274(d).
269. I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(A).
270. See supra text accompanying note 254. To bolster compliance with the rule requiring
the obtaining of an asset identification number, Congress could enact a failure-to-identify
penalty (akin to the existing penalty for failure to file correct information return, found in I.R.C.
§ 6721(a)), of, say, $50 per asset. However, the zero-basis default rule proposed in the text
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A zero-basis default rule seems rather harsh, and therefore, it might be tempting to
propose a less onerous kind of basis default rule, such as one that would allow
taxpayers to use a tax basis that equals the gross sales price discounted by the current
interest rate back to the date of initial acquisition (assuming that the latter can be
proven by documentary evidence). A discounting-back rule (such as the one just
described) might be combined with a "minimum basis rule." 272 However, any complex
rule of this sort-apart from being hard for taxpayers to understand-could encourage
opportunistic behavior. (Of course, these rules could be designed to produce a basis on
the low side, such as by providing for a very high discount rate and/or by assuming a
long-ago acquisition date in case of doubt.)
Whether or not to adopt a set of default rules other than the zero-basis rule is a
judgment call, but our view is that the zero-basis rule avoids confusion, complexity,
and risks. Moreover, the zero-basis default rule is wholly appropriate in situations
where the asset was acquired after the effective date of the proposed reforms because
the taxpayer will then have had the opportunity to apply for an asset ID number under
the AINS to establish a non-zero basis figure. However, possibly something other than
a zero-basis rule should be applicable to assets that can be proven to have been
acquired before the effective date of the proposed reforms.
Documentary proof of basis should be obtainable by taxpayers in the situations
covered by the zero-basis default rule. The assets for which taxpayers will have to
prove basis are mainly real estate, artwork, and collectibles, plus other assets not
covered by third-party-reporting-of-gain-and-loss systems. Real estate transactions
generate closing statements (issued by third parties); and artwork and collectibles of
significant value will not only have generated sales records (that may be traced to an
auction house or dealer), but also may have been entered in inventories compiled by
the taxpayer for purposes of casualty and theft insurance, in which context the
incentive may be (depending on the type of insurance coverage) to state a high cost. In
addition, unimproved land, artwork, and collectibles are rarely subject to basis
adjustments (other than those attendant upon gifts and bequests).
In many ways, technology enables the adoption of the proposed deemed-zero basis
default rule.273 First, third-party reporting of gains and losses obviates the taxpayer's
might well obviate the need for a separate penalty. See infra text accompanying notes 272-75.
271. The concept of "documentary" substantiation would exclude self-provided evidence,
such as diary entries and contemporaneous estimates. It would include written items provided by
or submitted to third parties, such as closing statements, sales invoices, and gift and estate tax
returns. Cf I.R.C. § 1059A (providing that the basis of property imported from a related person
is not to exceed its customs value). It is conceivable that documentary evidence might itself be
"approximate." An example would be a document revealing that certain shares of stock were
acquired from a decedent in the year 1922 but without a cost figure or an exact date. Here, the
correct result might be to fix the basis with reference to the lowest market price for that stock in
that year (or at the mean price for that year).
272. Thus, in the case of marketable securities for which no acquisition date is provable, the
basis could be the greater of (1) the price at original issue, (2) the value at the taxpayer's
fifteenth birthday, or (3) an amount equal to 10% of the gross proceeds of sale.
273. Congress apparently thinks that keeping track of basis is feasible even without reform
proposals of the type advanced here. Otherwise, Congress would not have enacted the new
carryover basis regime embodied in I.R.C. § 1022, slated to take effect in 2010 and thereafter
(assuming the estate tax repeal takes effect). Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001, I.R.C. § 1014 (Supp. II 2002). To make this rule operative, the decedent's personal
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basis responsibility for a significant number of assets. Second, for the remaining assets,
the AINS would allow taxpayers (and others) to establish (and record with the IRS) an
initial basis. As for assets that slip through the cracks, computer software programs
now allow users to transfer their written records (including third-party invoices) into
electronic form, reducing the need to keep bulky paperwork.274
Finally, a substantiation requirement would raise the bar for tax return preparers,
who would be required, at the risk of sanction, to prod the taxpayer to supply the
preparer with whatever documentary evidence the taxpayer has.
275
C. Instituting Legal Changes That Simplify Basis Identifications
Even if taxpayers and brokers do their part to help identify tax basis, they may find
their efforts impeded by the inherent complexity and dubious rationality of many of the
substantive rules that impact basis determinations. We offer the following substantive
law changes that would greatly facilitate tax basis identifications if adopted.276
1. Move to a mark-to-market system. Congress could institute a full accrual-based
system of taxation that requires the annual recognition of all gains and losses, except277
those pertaining to consumer durables and collectibles. While such a system would
entail annual changes in basis (to equal the FMV at the end of the previous year),2 78 it
would render the problem of record keeping a relic of the past. A partial accrual-based
system that would be limited to the annual recognition of gain and loss on liquid and
representative will have to supply the IRS and the recipient of the decedent's property with a
litany of information, including the following: (1) the name and taxpayer identification number
of the recipient of the property, (2) a description of the property, (3) the adjusted basis of the
property in the hands of the decedent and its FMV at the time of death, (4) the decedent's
holding period in the property, (5) information regarding the character of the property, (6) the
amount of basis increase the personal representative allocated to the property under I.R.C. §
1022(b) or (c), and (7) other information that the Treasury may require by regulation. I.R.C. §
6018(c) (effective Jan. 1, 2010). This information, however, will presumably only be available if
the decedent, during his or her life, kept accurate and complete books and records. The new
modified basis carryover rule thus strongly implies that Congress trusts taxpayers to take tax
basis identifications issues seriously and that not doing so will be at the taxpayers' own (or their
beneficiaries') peril.
274. See supra note 236 (referring to online services for tracking capital changes).
275. See supra note 113.
276. We recognize the political controversy that might surround the adoption of the reforms
we offer. Substantive tax law changes are more likely to be perceived as "tax increases,"
attracting political or ideological opposition. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to at least consider
substantive law changes within the income tax, and hopefully, some of these will prove to be
relatively noncontroversial.
277. See, e.g., Fred B. Brown, "Complete"Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1559,
1562 (1996) (detailing how an accrual-based tax system would operate); David J. Shakow,
Taxation Without Realization: A Proposalfor Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1119
(1986).
278. To illustrate, suppose on July 1 of Year 1,A purchases ten shares ofXcorporation stock
for $100; on December 31, the ten shares of X stock are worth $120. Under a mark-to-market
tax system, A would be taxed on $20, raising his year-end adjusted basis in his Xstock to $120.
Suppose further that at the end of Year 2, A sells her ten shares of Xstock for $125. Using her
Year 1 tax return, A could easily discern that her tax basis in her ten shares of X stock is $120.
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publicly traded assets would be more within the realm of political possibility.279
Moving even this far in the direction of a mark-to-market system would be quite
controversial,280 but the extension of mark-to-market taxation is justified by many
reasons, not the least of which is the simplification of basis issues.28 '
2. Abolish the system of separately taxing capital gains and losses. One of the
reasons that the IRS devotes little attention to basis compliance issues is that there is a
lower rate on capital gains than on ordinary income.282 Congress could move to a
unitary rate schedule for all income.
3. Repeal Code section 1031 and certain other tax-free exchange rules. Tax-free
like-kind exchanges under Code section 1031 (which mostly occur with respect to
investment real estate) not only pose complex basis rules,28 3 but even worse present a
major opportunity for overstating basis. 284 Similar issues arise with other tax-free
279. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 TAx L. REv. 95
(1999) (analyzing the virtues of a partial mark-to-market system); Joseph M. Dodge, A
Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50
TAX L. REv. 265, 294-372 (1995) (advocating mark-to-market taxation of publicly traded
corporate equity and debt).
280. Many persons may still think that realization is inherent in the concept of income, an
idea that was long dominant following the Supreme Court decision in Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (stating that income is not taxable unless it is "a gain accruing to capital;
not a growth or increment of value in the investment."). See also Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 63, 66 (1872) (stating that a "[m]ere advance in value in no sense constitutes the
gains, profits, or income specified by the statute"), quoted with approval in Lynch v. Turrish,
247 U.S. 221, 230 (1918). Attempts to roll back the realization principle, although begun with
I.R.C. §§ 475, 1256, would therefore probably be met with strong resistance. Extending the
mark-to-market rule beyond highly liquid (and easy-to-value) assets would prompt objections
relating to liquidity and valuation. See Shakow, supra note 277 (offering an exposition of how
Congress could overcome the problems of valuation and liquidity). Compare Weisbach, supra
note 279 (offering a partial mark-to-market system of taxation, limited mostly to financial assets,
in light of liquidity and valuation concerns).
281. This point has been virtually ignored by advocates of a mark-to-market system. See,
e.g., Brown, supra note 277, at 1564-95 (presenting a detailed list of all the advantages a mark-
to-market system offers, but not mentioning how its adoption would affect basis computations).
282. See supra note 220 (describing the recent history of capital gains rates). Other
arguments in favor of this move include vast simplification of the tax law and reduced distortion
of economic behavior. The usual arguments in favor of lower capital gain rates would dissolve
in favor of assets marked to market. Presumably, any move of this sort would be coupled with
an overall lowering of rates, as occurred under the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See S. REP. No. 99-
313, at 169-70 (1986).
283. The basis in the exchange property is equal to the basis the taxpayer had in the
transferred property, increased by the amount of any gain recognized (on account of the receipt
of boot) and decreased by (1) the amount of any money received, (2) the FMV of other property
received that is not like-kind property, and (3) the amount (if any) of recognized loss with
respect to in-kind boot. See I.R.C. § 1031 (d). Additional complications arise if either or both of
the properties are mortgaged.
284. When the property received in the exchange is sold, it is easier for the taxpayer to claim
a basis equal to putative cost (the FMV on acquisition) rather than the (usually lower) basis
obtained under the rule described supra note 283.
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exchanges (such as corporate formations and mergers),28 5 but these pose less abuse
potential as many of these capital changes can be tracked by brokers. Congress could
thus eliminate many tax-free exchange provisions, 28 6 whose justifications are too
tenuous to warrant retaining the provisions.
28 7
4. Replace Subchapter K by a liberalized Subchapter S regime. Commentators and
practitioners alike not only bemoan the complexity of the partnership taxation regime
housed in Subchapter K of the Code, but also intimate that compliance is haphazard at
best.288 The basis rules found in Subchapter K, for both inside and outside basis, are
especially intricate.28 9 We share the opinion of other commentators who argue that
Subchapter K should be wholly eliminated or drastically narrowed in its application.
290
285. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 354, 1035(d)(2), 1036(c)(2), 1037(c)(2).
286. See Fred B. Brown, Proposal to Reform the Like Kind and Involuntary Conversion
Rules in Light of Fundamental Tax Policies: A Simpler, More Rational and More Unified
Approach, 67 Mo. L. REv. 705 (2002) (suggesting that the like-kind and involuntary conversion
rules are in dire need of significant reform); Marjorie R. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't
NeedAnother Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 397 (1987) (arguing for the elimination of§ 1031); Eric
M. Jensen, The Uneasy Justification for Special Treatment of Like-Kind Exchanges, 4 Am. J.
TAX POL'Y 193 (1985) (finding flawed justifications for § 1031 while favoring its retention).
287. The principal justification for many of the Code's nonrecognition provisions is that
taxpayers continue to hold onto essentially the same investment before and after the exchange,
so tax deferral is appropriate. In most cases, the premise is false, especially in the case of real
estate swaps under I.R.C. § 1031. Even granting the premise, the conclusion does not follow
since an exchange is no different than a sale followed by a reinvestment (which is taxed).
Moreover, these provisions distort behavior and increase transaction costs. Thus, swaps of real
estate would be uncommon in the absence of I.R.C. § 1031, and the existence of I.R.C. § 1031
has created an army of real-estate-exchange middlemen having expertise in the intricacies of that
section.
We would maintain the tax-free status of certain exchanges whose justifications we do find
meritorious, including those related to business formations, see I.R.C. § § 351, 721; involuntary
conversions, see I.R.C. § 1033; exchanges of insurance policies (which are usually involuntary),
see I.R.C. § 1035; and interspousal transactions, see I.R.C. § 1041. We do not venture an
opinion as to whether corporate mergers and reorganizations should be tax-free at the
shareholder level.
288. One commentator states thus:
A large number of partnerships thus seem to be governed by what might be called
an "intuitive subchapter K." Taxpayers and tax advisers who want to comply
account for partnership transactions in ways that are consistent with their
conceptions of the basic aims of subchapter K; others account as adventurously as
they believe the IRS is likely to tolerate. IRS auditors challenge partnership
accounting only if it seems to be seriously out of whack. No one has the ability,
resources, and incentive to figure out exactly what the rules require.
Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future Without Subchapter
K, 4 FLA. TAx REv. 249,252 (1999).
289. See I.R.C. §§ 722, 723, 731(c)(4), 732, 733, 734, 737(c), 742, 743, 752, 754, 755.
290. See Lokken, supra note 288. These reforms are modeled, in part, on reforms offered in
Jeffrey L. Kwall, Taxing Private Enterprise in the New Millennium, 51 TAX LAW. 229 (1998).
Other commentators share the perspective that complexities besetting Subchapter K make it
administratively untenable. See Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership Taxation?, 47 TAX L.
REv. 105, 110 (1991) (relying on the "relatively simple foundation of Subchapter S, rather than
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We support its replacement by a liberalized version of Subchapter S that posits a
simple equity structure and provides relatively straightforward basis rules.
291
5. Adopt a deemed-realization system for gratuitous transfers and trust
distributions. If gifts and estate transfers were deemed-realization events, the
transferee's basis would be the amount realized by the donor or estate, which is the
FMV of the property upon transfer.292 Adopting a deemed-realization approach to
gratuitous transfers would prevent basis issues from lingering for long periods of time,
sometimes extending from one generation to another. This extension occurs under the
current basis rule for gifts and will occur (with great complexity) under the modified
carryover basis rule for estate transfers scheduled to take effect in the year 2010.293 The
same deemed-realization rule can (and should) be made to apply to in-kind trust
distributions.294
6. If gratuitous transfers are not treated as deemed-realization events, simplify the
carryover basis rule for gifts. The tax basis a donee has in a gifted asset currently
depends upon whether gift and generation-skipping transfer taxes were paid and if
there was an embedded loss in the gifted property (i.e., if, on the date of the gift, the
basis of the asset was in excess of its FMV).295 Doing away with these adjustments
would produce the simple rule that a donee's asset basis would always be that of the
donor. The loss-shifting rule results in there being no basis for gain and loss purposes
upon the intricately ornate base of Subchapter K [would permit] most of the arcane complexity
from this sector of tax law [to disappear]."); Martin D. Ginsburg, Maintaining Subchapter S in
an Integrated Tax World, 47 TAx L. REv. 665,669 (1992) ("[O]ne thing that makes subchapter
S look really good is [S]ubchapter K, the awesomely complex partnership tax provisions.");
Deborah S. Schenk, Commentary: Complete Integration in a Partial Integration World, 47 TAx
L. REV. 697, 712 (1992) ("[O]ne of the hallmarks of subchapter S is its... simplicity [relative
to subchapter K]."). Not all commentators, however, share this view. See, e.g., Walter D.
Schwidetzky, Is It Time to Give the S Corporation a Proper Burial?, 15 VA. TAX REv. 591
(1996); George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TA REv. 141
(1999) (advocating both a reformed Subchapter K and a more liberalized Subchapter S).
291. See I.R.C. § 1367 (distinguishing Subchapter K from Subchapter S by not factoring
entity liabilities into outside basis).
292. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A DeemedRealization Is Superior to Carryover Basis (and
Avoids Most of the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L. REv. 421 (2001); Michael J.
Graetz, Taxation of Unrealized Gains at Death-An Evaluation of the Current Proposals, 59
VA. L. REv. 830 (1973); Zelenak, supra note 8. A deemed-realization system was enacted in
Canada as a trade-off for repeal of the federal death tax. See R.S.C., ch. 1, s/a 70(5) (5th Supp.
1992) (Can.).
293. This provision, I.R.C. § 1022, is criticized by Dodge, supra note 37, and exhaustively
analyzed from a technical angle in Dennis L. Belcher & Mary Louise Fellows, Task Force on
Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, Report on Reform of Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, 58 TAX
LAW. 93, 124-95 (2004).
294. The existing rule is that the trust's basis carries over to the distributee. See I.R.C. §
643(e)(1). An election, however, can be made to recognize gain on such distributions. See I.R.C.
§ 643(e)(3). However, neither the estate's personal representative nor the trust's trustee has a
concomitant reporting requirement under present law to inform either the beneficiary or the IRS
what basis the recipient has in the transferred assets. We suspect that many beneficiaries
erroneously think that the basis they have in such property is equal to its FMV, based upon the
perception that assets received as the result of a death have a basis equal to FMV when
acquired, as opposed to the I.R.C. § 1014 rule that basis equals FMV at the date of death.
295. See supra notes 42-43.
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until the donee sells the asset.296 This rule is not worth the complexity involved,
especially since the shifting of a capital loss will not ordinarily significantly reduce a
taxpayer's tax burden, and the anti-loss-shifting rule is inconsistent with the fact that
gains are freely allowed to be shifted by way of gift. Congress should also repeal the
adjustment for gift taxes paid on unrealized appreciation. This adjustment has a
dubious (or at least noncompelling) rationale, 297 is not intuitively obvious, 298 and is too
rarely applied to have attracted a meaningful political constituency.
299
7. Adopt clear rules on the repairs-versus-improvements issue for real estate not
used in a trade or business. Investors and residence owners have an incentive to claim
borderline costs on real estate as improvements (which will increase basis) rather than
as repairs, which are either inherently nondeductible or deductible only in varying
degrees. 300 Regulations should be issued that treat costs relating to real estate (not used
in a trade or business), other than acquisition costs, as repairs in all cases other than
296. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-1(a)(l)--(2) (as amended in 1971).
297. The idea behind the adjustment for gift taxes attributable to unrealized appreciation is
that the income tax on the unrealized appreciation (if it had been realized by the donor) would
have reduced the estate tax base of the donor (which would have benefited the donee by
reducing the estate tax); but since this scenario does not play out, the second-best solution was
seen as giving the donee a roughly commensurate income tax benefit. In other words, the theory
is similar to that of I.R.C. § 691 (c), providing for an income tax deduction equal to the estate tax
attributable to estate inclusion of the IRD right. See H. R. REP. No. 94-1380, at 44 (1976)
(stating that the idea is to prevent a tax on a tax).
Upon closer inspection, this rationale fails to pass muster. First, the fact is that the donor
avoided income tax by making the gift and could have prevented gain to the donee by holding
onto the property until death. Tax rules should be based on what actually happens, not what
might have happened under an alternate scenario. Second, the gift tax and the reduced income
tax on the gain are paid by different taxpayers. Third, I.R.C. § 275(a)(3) prohibits the deduction
of gift taxes, and I.R.C. § 263A(a)(2) prohibits the capitalization of nondeductible items. Thus,
§ 101 5(d)(6) is inconsistent with these provisions. Fourth, there is the overall policy issue of
why the gift tax should be so diluted (indirectly), given that the gift tax base already obtains an
implicit deduction for the gift tax itself. See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, "Gifts, Gaffs,
and Gefts "'-The Income Tax Definition and Treatment ofPrivate and Charitable "Gifts "and a
PrincipledPolicy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NoTRE DAME L. REv.
441,484-86 (2003) (stating that adding all or part of gift tax to basis is not logically necessary).
298. The explanation set forth in supra note 297 would only occur to a tax specialist seeking
perfection. The rationale of the adjustment cannot be that the gift tax is a "cost" of acquiring the
gift that should be added to basis. Transaction costs are added to cost basis, but not to "free"
basis. Thus, Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4 (as amended in 1972) states that in the case where a donee
incurs a cost in obtaining gift property, the basis of the donee is the greater of such cost or the
carryover basis, not the sum of the two.
299. Only a handful of gifts would actually trigger a gift tax that would give rise to this
adjustment. In 1976, Congress curtailed this adjustment with no apparent resistance. See I.R.C.
§ 1015(d)(1).
300. Repairs on a personal-use asset are not deductible at all under I.R.C. § 165(c). Repairs
on a vacation home must be prorated between rental and personal use, and the deductions
attributable to rental use may be deferred. See I.R.C. § 280A(c). Repairs on rental property may
also add to "passive activity losses," which are deferred under I.R.C. § 469. Repairs on
(nonrental) investment property are "miscellaneous itemized deductions," subject to
disallowance in an amount equal to 2% of adjusted gross income under I.R.C. § 67.
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those involving (a) adding square footage or (b) altering the real estate's function or
use, regardless of the cost. 30' Such a rule would prevent claimed basis increases for
roof and foundation repairs; installation of kitchen, electronic, heating, and air-
conditioning equipment and systems; addition of swimming pools, spas, docks, fences,
and tennis courts; and other home-remodeling endeavors.
30 2
8. Adopt a blended-basis rule for different lots of the same stock. Where a person
acquires shares of a given stock at various times (and at different per-share costs), the
sale of some of such stock raises the issue of figuring out which shares were sold.
Present law posits various methods of identification, 30 3 but their application has proven
unwieldy, unnecessary, and confusing. Since shares of the same stock held by the same
taxpayer are fungible, a blended-basis rule is not only appropriate in principle but
would also be the easiest to administer.
Listed above are several legislative reform proposals that Congress could institute to
greatly facilitate tax basis identifications. By making these changes, taxpayers would
have a much easier time computing their gains and losses, and Congress would likely
reap the benefit of these simplification changes in the form of enhanced revenue flow.
III. TRANSITlON RuLEs
Some reform proposals-notwithstanding their theoretical merits-require
transition rules that are complex, nonadministrable, and/or inequitable. 304 For example,
301. Existing Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1963) states that an outlay is a capital expenditure if it
"materially add[s] to the value" or "appreciably prolong[s] its life," but these tests are vague and
open-ended because they fail to specify the baseline for comparison. Thus, any outlay on
property increases its value and prolongs its life relative to the condition that the property would
fall into if the outlay were not made. This distinction is frequently litigated. See 3 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. (CCH) 8630 (containing twenty-nine pages of short annotations of cases and rulings
solely on the issue of business repairs). Moreover, recent regulations in the area of intangibles
have tilted the balance toward finding outlays to be expenses rather than capital expenditures.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4 to -5 (as amended in 2004).
302. If items like those described are added to basis, the basis of the items removed should
be subtracted out, but we have never heard of any taxpayer doing this with respect to personal-
use property. Thus, it appears that homeowners are routinely guilty of including the cost of both
new and removed equipment, etc., as part of the basis in the same building.
303. See supra note 29.
304. There are many views on the necessity of transitional rules. Some commentators argue
that transitional rules are necessary for reasons of fairness and efficiency. See generally DAVID
F. BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFoRM 159-66 (2d ed. 1984). There are others who
view tax law changes as being an aspect of market risk and, that being the case, argue that tax
law changes do not require transitional relief. Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of
Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977); Louis Kaplow, An
Economic Analysis ofLegal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REV. 509 (1986). Cf Kyle D. Logue, Tax
Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94
MICH. L. REv. 1129 (1996) (positing that some transition rules may be appropriate, depending
on the nature of the proposed tax law change); DANIEL SHAvIRo, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN
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as previously described, when Congress adopted a carryover tax basis rule in 1976, a
series of intricate transition rules accompanied its adoption.30 5 These transition rules
were perceived to be so incomprehensible that they, along with other factors, 306 led to
the ultimate retroactive repeal of the carryover tax basis rule.30 7 The transition rules
necessary to implement the changes we propose, however, do not suffer from these
problems.
Our proposal that brokers and pass-through entities keep track of basis and calculate
gain and loss without taxpayer involvement can be applied retroactively because
brokers will (in most cases) have the purchase records and the ability to track basis
changes. In the case of pass-through entities, it should be initially presumed that the
entity would not know of the equity holder's initial basis. In this type of case and in
brokered-asset cases in which the broker cannot determine the date and cost of
purchase, there are two options.
The first option would be to require the taxpayer to register problem assets under
the AINS, which in this case would require the usual personal information, the date of
acquisition, information about the asset acquired (such as, where applicable, the
number of shares acquired on that date), and the acquisition date basis, accompanied
by a list (and description) of what documents the taxpayer has to support these entries.
This information would be submitted to not only the IRS but also the broker or pass-
through entity, and thereafter these assets would be subject to the third-party reporting
system unless the IRS rejected the application on its face (for vagueness or not listing
adequate documentary proof). If no AINS ID number is obtained, the basis would be
deemed to be zero.308 This approach would impose some administrative burdens on the
IRS and taxpayers, and it would pose some risk of basis overstatement, but the latter
problem can be diluted somewhat by treating the taxpayer-supplied information as
nonconclusive when challenged by the IRS.
If a mandatory AINS proves untenable on its own, the other alternative is to couple
an elective AINS with an alternative default rule (other than a zero-basis rule). One
possible default rule would be to continue the existing status quo under which
taxpayers could substantiate the tax basis they had in a particular asset by whatever
means possible, and the Cohan rule would remain applicable when (and if)
controversies arose. 309 Another possible default rule would require the establishment of
the asset's FMV as of the effective date, and that FMV would be discounted back (at a
high discount rate) to the date of acquisition.310 Consumer assets (other than those
EcoNoMIc AND PoLmCAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSmON RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 18-19,27-32,
48-53, 101-02 (2000) (offering a critical analysis of the Graetz/Kaplow viewpoints).
305. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
306. For example, the carryover basis rule established a labyrinth series of instructions that
executors were to follow to adjust tax basis between and among the decedents' assets. See
Former I.R.C. § 1023(c) (1976) (repealed 1980); Former I.R.C. § 1023(h)(3) (repealed 1980)
(providing tax basis adjustments for federal and state estate taxes paid based upon each asset's
net appreciation).
307. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 229,
299.
308. See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text. Application of this transition rule in
particular would presuppose adequate evidence that the asset in question was in fact acquired
before the effective date, and application of the discounting-back rule would require adequate
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having appreciation potential) would be exempt from any strong basis-proof rule 31
unless a casualty loss is claimed.
The proposal relating to the withholding (by third parties) of tax on the proceeds of
certain sales should apply to pre-effective date assets because this is only a tax
collection device, not a change in substantive or evidentiary law.
Finally, the need for special transition rules for the legislative changes we propose
would depend upon the particular reform measure in question. Those changes that
modify existing tax basis rules (e.g., a universal gift tax basis rule or the elimination of
many tax-free exchanges) could be effective immediately and no transition rules would
be necessary. The issue of whether more sweeping changes (such as the elimination of
Subchapter K or a shift toward a full or partial mark-to-market tax system) would
require transition rules should be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 3
12
CONCLUSION
For close to one hundred years, the income tax system in the United States has
functioned efficiently and has earned worldwide respect. One of its principal premises
is that taxpayers can (and do) accurately measure their gains and losses from the sale or
disposition of their assets. To do so, taxpayers must be in a position to correctly
identify the tax basis of assets sold or disposed of This Article explores the reasons
that taxpayers inadvertently or intentionally misreport the tax basis they have in their
assets (and do not report gains) and why external and internal constraints do little to
dissuade this behavior. As a result of the breakdown in this process, the government
stands to lose billions of dollars of revenue annually.
The reform measures this analysis advocates are administratively feasible and have
ample historical precedent. Expanding third-party reporting requirements to include,
where appropriate, running basis figures and the calculation of gains and losses is a
logical extension of existing requirements of reporting gross sales proceeds. The
expansion is close to already being in place for mutual fund shares, and advances and
availability of technology make this possible. Technology also allows the creation of
an AINS, which would mainly be used for unique assets, such as real estate, artwork,
collectibles, and closely held business interests. The zero-basis default rule is simply an
extension of the substantiation rule for certain deductions found in I.R.C. section
274(d) (and, to a lesser extent, I.R.C. sections 170(0(8) and (11)). The withholding-tax
proposal is an extension of I.R.C. sections 897 and 1445. Even the discounting-back
approach (offered as a possible transition-period default rule) has antecedents. 313 Were
Congress to take additional steps to simplify basis rules, even more progress toward
accurately reporting tax basis could be achieved. Not only can our proposals be readily
proof of the year of acquisition.
311. Basis information for consumer durables would not be readily available and there is
scant likelihood that such items will be sold at a gain (and losses on these personal-use items are
disallowed under I.R.C. § 165(c), except in the case of personal casualty losses). See I.R.C. §
165(h).
312. See, e.g., Shakow, supra note 277, at 1178-83.
313. Apart from Former I.R.C. § 1023(h)(3) (repealed 1980), mentioned in supra note 306,
Treas. Reg. § 1.483-4 (1996) and § 1.1275-4(c) (as amended in 2004) use a discounting-back
method to identify the imputed interest component of a payment made pursuant to a contingent-
payment sale of property reported under the open-transaction method.
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instituted, but they also have (as a package) the virtue of actually lightening the
compliance burden on taxpayers to a significant degree.
Unlike many other laudable reform measures (e.g., simplification of the dependent
care credit), 31 4 the proposals we champion (with the exception of certain substantive
law changes) are fairly unique in being able to generate significant revenue without
being perceived as a politically forbidden "tax increase." 31 5 Adoption of our proposals
would entail negligible costs to the government and reduced burdens for investors,
although third parties would admittedly have slightly higher administrative costs
(which could be factored into the fees they charge).
We started this journey with the myth that basis rules are self-actualizing, examining
why this myth is contrary to reality. En route, we established that adoption of the
proposed reform measures we advocate would tame the basis dragon. Myths, after all,
can become reality.
314. See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, Old Wine in Old Bottles: Simplification ofFamily Status
Tax Issues, 91 TAX NoTEs 1437, 1452 (2001) (proposing that "the credit also could be
simplified by eliminating the requirement that a taxpayer must maintain a household in which
the qualifying individual lives").
315. See generally SHELDON D. POLLACK, REFINANCING AMERICA: THE REPUBLICAN ANTI-
TAX AGENDA (2003); Sheldon D. Pollack, Republican Antitax Policy, 91 TAX NoTEs 289
(2001). Consider too, that the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118
Stat. 1418, contained numerous revenue-raising provisions, many of them of a procedural or
semiprocedural nature. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 72(w) (effectively lowering the basis of annuities of
nonresident aliens), 170(t)(1 1)-(12) (increasing the substantiation requirements for certain
charitable contributions), 409A (limiting the ability to defer compensation), 453(f) (restricting
the installment method further), 6039G (requiring reporting by expatriates), 6043A (requiring
the reporting of boot in mergers and acquisitions to IRS, brokers, and shareholders), 6111-12
(providing for disclosures relating to "reportable transactions" as defined in I.R.C. § 6707A),
6707-08 (creating penalties for failure to comply with I.R.C. § 6111), 7701(n) (requiring that
notice be given by expatriates to obtain certain tax benefits). State governments that have seen
their revenues recently dwindle have likewise turned increasingly to the institution of
compliance measures to maintain their fiscal solvencies. See Timothy Catts, Prompted by
Budget Crises, States Consider 'Loophole' Remedy, 28 ST. TA NoTEs 271 (2003).
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